

Capabilities Evaluation

1. Governance

Select the option that best describes your area

- County-wide decision-making groups are informal and do not yet have a strategic plan to guide collective communications interoperability goals and funding.
- Some formal agreements exist and informal agreements are in practice among members of the decision making group for the county. Strategic and budget planning processes are beginning to be put in place.
- Formal agreements outline the roles and responsibilities of a county-wide decision making group, which has an agreed upon strategic plan that addresses sustainable funding for collective, regional interoperable communications needs.
- County-wide decision making bodies proactively look to expand membership to ensure representation from broad public support disciplines and other levels of government, while updating their agreements and strategic plan on a regular basis.

2. Standard Operating Procedure

Select the option that best describes your area

- County-wide Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are not developed or have not been formalized and disseminated.
- Some interoperable communications SOPs exist within the county and steps have been taken to institute these interoperability procedures among some agencies.
- Interoperable communications SOPs are formalized and in use by all agencies within the county. Despite minor issues, SOPs are successfully used during responses and/or exercises.
- Interoperable communications SOPs within the county are formalized and regularly reviewed. Additionally, NIMS procedures are well established among all agencies and disciplines. All needed procedures are effectively utilized during responses and/or exercises.

3. Technology

Select the option that best describes your area

- Interoperability within the area is primarily achieved through the use of gateways (mobile/fixed gateway, console patch), shared radios, or use of a radio cache.
- Interoperability within the county is primarily achieved through the use of shared channels or talk groups.
- Interoperability within the county is primarily achieved through the use of a proprietary shared system.

Interoperability within the county is primarily achieved through the use of standards-based shared system (e.g., Project 25).

4. Frequency Band(s)

What frequency band(s) do public safety agencies within the area currently utilize? (Check all that apply)

VHF-Low Band

VHF-High Band

UHF 450-470

UHF "T Band" 470-512

UHF 700 MHz

UHF 800 MHz

UHF 700/800 MHz

5. Training & Exercises

Select the option that best describes your area

County-wide public safety agencies participate in communications interoperability workshops, but no formal training or exercises are focused on emergency communications.

Some public safety agencies within the county hold communications interoperability training on equipment and conduct exercises, although not on a regular cycle.

Public safety agencies within the county participate in equipment and SOP training for communications interoperability and hold exercises on a regular schedule.

County public safety agencies regularly conduct training and exercises with communications interoperability curriculum addressing equipment and SOPs that is modified as needed to address the changing operational environment.

6. Role of Interoperability

Select the option that best describes your area

First responders across the county seldom use solutions unless advanced planning is possible (e.g., special events).

First responders across the county use interoperability solutions regularly for emergency events, and in limited fashion for day-to-day communications.

First responders across the county use interoperability solutions regularly and easily for all day-to-day, task force, and mutual aid events.

Regular use of solutions for all day-to-day and out-of-the-ordinary events across the county on demand, in real time, when needed, as authorized.

7. Communications Equipment Use

Select from the drop down list what best describes the frequency with which your area uses the equipment

Cell phones/Direct Connect

Satellite Phones

Mobile Data: Commercial Networks*

Mobile Data: Private Networks

Other Data

Other – Please fill in blank

**Commercial Networks that operate at or above 128K; also includes use of broadband devices such as smart phones, mobile e-mail devices, or wireless air cards.*

Please contact NECPgoals@hq.dhs.gov if you have any questions.

Performance Evaluation

This online tool provides a standardized approach and set of weighted criteria to measure response-level emergency communications, which is defined as:

The capacity of individuals with primary operational leadership responsibility to manage resources and make timely decisions during an incident involving multiple agencies, without technical or procedural communications impediments.

This tool provides State, urban, local, and tribal practitioners with an after-action reporting capability to independently and regularly assess response-level emergency communications following planned events and real incidents involving multiple jurisdictions and agencies. The tool may also be used by jurisdictions that are seeking to demonstrate Goal 2 of the National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Emergency Communications developed the NECP to improve interoperability, operability, and continuity of communications for emergency responders in all disciplines and levels of government. Please visit [DHS.gov](https://www.dhs.gov) for a complete copy of the [NECP](#).

This tool should take 1 hour to complete.

[« Go Back to Evaluations](#)

[Log Out](#)

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Part 1: Background Information

Incident, Planned Event, or Exercise Information

Event Type: * Please choose

Event Name: *

Event Date (MM/DD/YYYY): * 

Event Address:

Event Address Line 2:

Which other counties, if any, had significant participation in the event?

State: Please choose County: Please select a state first

List total number of agencies involved in the incident, planned event, or exercise *

Federal * Please Choose

State * Please Choose

Local * Please Choose

Non-governmental * Please Choose

List all Federal, State, local, or tribal agencies involved in the incident, planned event, or exercise:

Briefly describe the incident, planned event, or exercise:

Indicate all communications technologies used in the incident, planned event, or exercise covered by this evaluation: [Check the appropriate boxes]

Swap Radios

Gateways

Shared Channels

- Proprietary Shared System
- Standards-Based Shared System
- Broadband
- Cellular
- Mobile Data
- Other – Please fill in blank

[Cancel & Delete Event](#)

Page 1 of 18

Jump to:

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Part 2: Incident Selection Guidance

Event: Test

Use this checklist to decide if the incident, planned event, or exercise that you are considering is suitable for the demonstration of response-level emergency communications during routine events. To assure an accurate evaluation, answer carefully. **Ideally, all the items should be marked “Yes.” If not, consider whether other incidents, planned events, or exercises would be more suitable.** Generally, the more “Yes” answers that you have, the more suitable the incident, planned event, or exercise is for determining if response-level emergency communications was demonstrated.

Guidelines

Did the response involve multiple agencies and emergency response disciplines within one hour of the incident, planned event, or exercise? Yes No

Was the incident, planned event, or exercise managed under a National Incident Management System (NIMS)-compliant Incident Command System (ICS)? Yes No

Does sufficient documentation exist to provide for independent validation and verification of the adequacy of response-level emergency communications? Yes No

« Save & Go Back

Save & Continue »

Save & Log Out

Page 2 of 18

Jump to:

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Part 3: Supporting Evaluation Criteria (SEC)

Event: Test

Once a suitable incident, planned event, or exercise is selected for evaluation and a primary demonstration of response-level emergency communications is achieved, particular criteria can be examined. These criteria dive into aspects of emergency response that affect communications interoperability: Common policies and procedures, responder roles and responsibilities, and quality and continuity. Most are qualitative, asking for a judgment call on how well, or how often, something occurred. Others just seek to determine whether or not something happened.

The wording for qualitative measures is purposefully broad. For example, one question asks,

Were established interagency communications policies and procedures followed throughout the incident, planned event, or exercise?

The offered answers are:

- *N/A (none exist)*
- *None of the time*
- *Some of the time*
- *Most of the time*
- *All of the time*

A judgment call is necessary in choosing between “Some of the time” or “Most of the time.” Without attempting to set an impractical degree of accuracy, consider “Half of the time” as the dividing line between those two options. If something did happen, but happened less than half of the time, choose “Some.” If it happened more frequently, but not always, choose “Most.”

Following each criteria, you have an opportunity to provide additional information supporting your responses. Please explain if there were, or still are, broader circumstances that influenced the results. **Consider identifying success factors and challenges that led to your conclusions.**

There are 32 supporting evaluation questions totaling 100 points. By assigning points to many of the Supporting Evaluation Criterion, a total is created that provides a snapshot of response-level emergency communications demonstration.

Page 3 of 18

Jump to:

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Common Policies & Procedures

Event: Test

SEC 1: Interagency communications policies and procedures were common or consistent amongst all responding agencies.

Guidance

Written policies and procedures indicate a higher degree of formal standardization. They may exist in higher level strategic documents, such as memoranda of understanding and interagency agreements, or procedures adopted commonly at an operational or tactical level.

Interagency policies and procedures are meaningless if not used, though. In evaluating incidents, planned events, or exercises, it is important to question their use.

[Hide Guidance]

SEC 1.1: Did policies and procedures exist for interagency communications between the involved jurisdictions, agencies, and disciplines? N/A (none exist) In some cases In most cases In all needed cases

SEC 1.2: Were they written? N/A (none exist) In some cases In most cases In all needed cases

Success Factors (Optional)

Challenges (Optional)

Recommendations (C

« Save & Go Back

Save & Continue »

Save & Log Out

Page 4 of 18

Jump to:

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Common Policies & Procedures

Event: Test

SEC 2: Established interagency communications policies and procedures were followed throughout the incident, planned event, or exercise.

Guidance

Shared communications assets bridge technological gaps between jurisdictions, agencies, and disciplines. Typical shared assets include interagency talkgroups, shared channels, gateways, and radio caches. Unclear or non-existent policies and procedures for such resources impede their effective use during operations.

[Hide Guidance]

SEC 2.1: Were established interagency communications policies and procedures followed throughout the incident, planned event, or exercise?

N/A (none exist) None of the time Some of the time Most of the time All of the time

SEC 2.2: Did established policies and procedures exist between responding agencies for request, activation, accountability, deactivation, and problem resolution of deployable interagency communications resources, such as mobile communications centers, gateways, and radio caches? N/A (none exist) In some cases In most cases In all needed cases

SEC 2.3: If so, were they followed? [Information Only] N/A (none needed) None were Some were Most were All were

Success Factors (Optional)

Challenges (Optional):

Recommendations (C

« Save & Go Back

Save & Continue »

Save & Log Out

Page 5 of 18

Jump to:

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Common Policies & Procedures

Event: Test

SEC 3: Interagency communications policies and procedures across all responding agencies were consistent with NIMS.

Guidance

The Interoperability Continuum identifies NIMS-integrated SOPs as being located at the optimal end of this crucial element to interoperability. NIMS establishes clearly defined communications roles and responsibilities and enables integration of all communications elements as the ICS structure expands during an incident, planned event, or exercise.

[\[Hide Guidance\]](#)

SEC 3.1: Were interagency communications policies and procedures across responding agencies consistent with NIMS? N/A (none exist)
 Some were Most were All were

Success Factors (Optional)

Challenges (Optional)

Recommendations (Optional):

« Save & Go Back

Save & Continue »

Save & Log Out

Page 6 of 18

Jump to:

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Common Policies & Procedures

Event: Test

SEC 4: A priority order for use of interagency communications resources was followed as established in standard operation procedures or plans, such as the Tactical Interoperable Communications Plan (TICP).

Guidance

Simultaneous, perhaps conflicting, demands for shared resources can arise. Even though routine events will rarely tax the interagency communications resources of most regions, other events occurring at the same time, as well as training and exercises, may lead to conflicts. Policies and procedures establishing priorities for use are necessary to avoid conflicts that may impede operational effectiveness and jeopardize life or property.

[\[Hide Guidance\]](#)

SEC 4.1 Does a priority order exist for use of interagency communications resources (e.g., life safety before property protection)? Yes No

SEC 4.2 Was this prioritization of communications resource use followed? N/A (none needed) None of the time Some of the time Most of the time All of the time

Success Factors (Optional)

Challenges (Optional)

Recommendations (Optional):

« Save & Go Back

Save & Continue »

Save & Log Out

Page 7 of 18

Jump to:



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Common Policies & Procedures

Event: Test

SEC 5: A primary interagency operations talk path was clearly established by procedure or communicated to responders early in the incident, planned event, or exercise.

Guidance

The ability of emergency responders from different agencies to communicate by radio is the heart of communications interoperability. In order to facilitate radio communications, many areas of the country establish primary interagency talk paths for routine responder use. These talk paths are put to use understanding procedures, upon assignment by a central resource, or on an ad hoc basis during the incident, planned event, or exercise. Talk paths may come in the form of a trunked talk group, a conventional channel, or a combination of channels tied together by a gateway, effectively forming a single channel.

Safe, efficient, and effective operations can be compromised if a primary interagency operations talk path is not clearly established from the outset of an incident, planned event, or exercise.

[Hide Guidance]

SEC 5.1: Was a primary interagency communications talk path clearly established by procedures used during the incident, planned event, or exercise? Yes No

SEC 5.2: If not, was such a talk path established ad hoc and communicated to responders early in the incident, planned event, or exercise? Yes No

Success Factors (Optional):

Challenges (Optional):

Recommendations (0)

« Save & Go Back

Save & Continue »

Save & Log Out

Page 8 of 18

Jump to:

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Common Policies & Procedures

Event: Test

SEC 6: Common terminology and plain language were used in all interagency communications.

Guidance

Both the NECP and NIMS core document establish the importance of common and consistent terminology for communications interoperability. This includes the use of plain language and elimination of codes during interagency communications. The use of plain language and common terminology ensures communications are timely, clear, acknowledged, and understood by all receivers.

[\[Hide Guidance\]](#)

SEC 6.1: Was plain language used throughout the incident, planned event, or exercise? None of the time Some of the time Most of the time All of the time

SEC 6.2: Did any communications problems arise amongst the primary operational leadership due to a lack of common terminology? Yes No

SEC 6.3: Did any communications problems arise amongst other response-level emergency personnel during the incident, planned event, or exercise due to a lack of common terminology? Yes No

Success Factors (Optional):

Challenges (Optional):

Recommendations (

« Save & Go Back

Save & Continue »

Save & Log Out

Page 9 of 18

Jump to:

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Common Policies & Procedures

Event: Test

SEC 7: Clear unit identification procedures were used.

Guidance

Similarly, ambiguous unit identification procedures have been identified as an impediment to interoperability. Problems can and do occur in interagency communications when responders from different jurisdictions mistake unit identifiers being used over the radio. National best practices, such as TICPs required of UASIs and other designated metropolitan regions in 2006, call for a clear indication of the responding agency or jurisdiction in addition to unit identification in radio transmissions during interagency operations.

[Hide Guidance]

SEC 7.1: Were clear unit identification procedures used amongst the primary operational leadership? None of the time Some of the time Most of the time All of the time

SEC 7.2: Were clear unit identification procedures used amongst other response-level emergency personnel throughout the incident, planned event, or exercise? None of the time Some of the time Most of the time All of the time

Success Factors (Optional)

Challenges (Optional)

Recommendations (C

« Save & Go Back

Save & Continue »

Save & Log Out

Page 10 of 18

Jump to:

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Common Policies & Procedures

Event: Test

SEC 8: Common channel names were used for designated interoperability channels.

[Guidance](#)

The NECP stresses the importance of common channel names as a key operational protocol related to the use of plain language. Disparate channel names have been identified as an impediment to interagency communications, rendering responders unable to identify common channels.

[\[Hide Guidance\]](#)

SEC 8.1: Were common names used by all responding agencies for interagency communications channels? N/A (no such channels used)
 None of the time Some of the time Most of the time All of the time

SEC 8.2: Were standard names as identified in the National Interoperability Field Operations Guide (NIFOG) used for Federal Communications Commission (FCC)-designated interoperability channels?
 N/A (no such channels used) None of the time Some of the time Most of the time All of the time

Success Factors (Optional)

Challenges (Optional)

Recommendations (Optional):

« Save & Go Back

Save & Continue »

Save & Log Out

Page 11 of 18

Jump to:

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Common Policies & Procedures

Event: Test

SEC 8: Common channel names were used for designated interoperability channels.

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[Hide Guidance]

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 N/A (no such channels used) None of the time Some of the time Most of the time All of the time

Success Factors (Optional)

Challenges (Optional)

Recommendations (Optional):

« Save & Go Back

Save & Continue »

Save & Log Out

Page 11 of 18

Jump to:



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Responder Roles & Responsibilities

Event: Test

SEC 9: Multiple organizations with inherent responsibility for some portion of the incident, planned event, or exercise were present and joined in a unified command with a single individual designated with Operations Section Chief responsibilities.

Guidance

A single individual was designated with Operations Section Chief responsibilities.

[\[Hide Guidance\]](#)

SEC 9.1: Did a single individual carry out the Operations Section Chief responsibilities in each operational period? Yes No

Success Factors (Optional)

Challenges (Optional)

Recommendations (Optional)

« Save & Go Back

Save & Continue »

Save & Log Out

Page 12 of 18

Jump to:



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Responder Roles & Responsibilities

Event: Test

SEC 10: Span of control was maintained amongst the primary operational leadership: The Operations Section Chief and first-level subordinates.

Guidance

As a hierarchical system, ICS establishes all responsibilities initially with the Incident Commander and provides for delegation of those responsibilities as the incident expands. All functions, including communications, are the responsibility of the Incident Commander. Span of control management principles guide delegation of intermediate supervisory responsibilities as more resources respond to an incident, planned event, or exercise. These principles have long existed within NIMS and its predecessors.

The principle is that individuals with supervisory responsibility should manage three to seven subordinates, with five subordinates considered optimal in most cases. Excessive span of control can result in both practical and technical communications problems as too many responders compete to access their supervisory channel.

[Hide Guidance]

SEC 10.1: Did the Operations Section Chief directly manage more than seven subordinates at any time? Yes No

SEC 10.2: Did first-level subordinates to the Operations Section Chief directly manage more than seven subordinates at any time? In no cases In some cases In most cases In all cases

Success Factors (Op

Challenges (Optional):

Recommendations (

« Save & Go Back

Save & Continue »

Save & Log Out

Page 13 of 18

Jump to:

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Responder Roles & Responsibilities

Event: Test

SEC 11: Communications Unit Leader (COML) roles and responsibilities were carried out by the IC/UC or designee.

- *Necessary communications resources were effectively ordered using documented procedures.*
- *A communications plan was established by procedure or developed early in the incident, planned event, or exercise.*

Guidance

Well-established as a means of improving communications interoperability is use of the ICS COML function. For incidents, planned events, or exercises large enough to call for staffing of this function, the COML is responsible for integrating communications with the response and action plan. Routine events, however, rarely call for staffing of the function. Consequently, COML roles and responsibilities continue to rest with the Incident Commander unless, and until, delegated.

Primary COML responsibilities include determination of need for resources, preparation and maintenance of an incident radio communications plan, and obtaining and supporting needed resources.

[Hide Guidance]

SEC 11.1: Was the ICS COML position specifically filled during the incident, planned event, or exercise? Yes No

SEC 11.2: Were COML roles and responsibilities carried out, either by the Incident Commander (or Unified Command), the COML, or another designee? None were Some were Most were All were

SEC 11.3: Who by position or function carried out the responsibilities?

SEC 11.4: Were necessary communications resources effectively ordered? N/A (none needed) None were Some were Most were All were

SEC 11.5: Were they ordered using documented procedures? N/A (none needed) None were Some were Most were All were

SEC 11.6: Was a communications plan established by procedure or developed early in the incident, planned event, or exercise? Yes No

SEC 11.7: Did the communications plan meet the communications needs of the primary operational leadership? [Information only]

Yes No

Success Factors (Optional)

Challenges (Optional)

Recommendations (Optional)

« Save & Go Back

Save & Continue »

Save & Log Out

Page 14 of 18

Jump to:

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Quality & Continuity

Event: Test

SEC 12: No more than one out of 10 transmissions was repeated amongst the primary operational leadership due to failure of initial communications attempts.

Guidance

Any number of technical, procedural, and even environmental factors may lead to the need for repeated transmissions. The need itself would be difficult to directly assess, but conclusions can be drawn indirectly based on the apparent proportion of repeated transmissions. Responders to the incident or planned event, as well as participants and observers in exercises, may be in the best positions to assess whether retransmissions were necessary due to an initial failure, regardless of cause. Keep in mind that the ultimate goal of the evaluation criteria is to determine whether effective communications have occurred.

[\[Hide Guidance\]](#)

SEC 12.1: Were more than one out of every 10 transmissions repeated due to failure of initial communications attempts amongst the primary operational leadership? Yes No

Success Factors (Optional)

Challenges (Optional)

Recommendations (Optional):

« Save & Go Back

Save & Continue »

Save & Log Out

Page 15 of 18

Jump to:

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Quality & Continuity

Event: Test

SEC 13: Upon failure or overload of any primary communications mode, a back-up was provided.

Guidance

Communications of the primary operational leadership during incident response is critical and must be maintained at all times for safety, efficiency, and effectiveness. Though emergency responders infrequently face system failures, particularly during routine events, the availability of backup resources and their effective use, if needed, are suitable for evaluation.

[Hide Guidance]

SEC 13.1: Was a back-up resource available for communications amongst the primary operational leadership in case of failure of the primary mode?

Yes No

SEC 13.2: Did the primary mode fail during the incident, planned event, or exercise at any time? [Information only] Yes No

SEC 13.3: If so, was a back-up effectively provided? Yes No

Success Factors (Optional)

Challenges (Optional)

Recommendations (Optional):

« Save & Go Back

Save & Continue »

Save & Log Out

Page 16 of 18

Jump to:

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Quality & Continuity

Event: Test

SEC 14: Primary operational leadership communicated adequately to manage resources and make timely decisions during the incident, planned event, or exercise.

Guidance

It is important to ask whether the primary operational leadership communicated adequately to manage resources and make timely decisions during the incident, planned event, or exercise.

[\[Hide Guidance\]](#)

SEC 14.1: Overall, was the primary operational leadership able to communicate adequately to manage resources during the incident, planned event, or exercise? None of the time Some of the time Most of the time All of the time

Success Factors (Optional)

Challenges (Optional)

Recommendations (Optional):

« Save & Go Back

Save & Continue »

Save & Log Out

Page 17 of 18

Jump to:

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Performance Evaluation Summary

Event: Test

[Save & Log Out](#)

Your form is incomplete. Please go back and complete the required questions.

Part 1: Background Information

Preparer Information

State: Louisiana

County: Acadia

Incident, Planned Event, or Exercise Information

Type of Event: Planned event

Event Name: Test

Event Address:

Event Address Line 2:

List total number of agencies involved in the incident, planned event, or exercise:

Federal 1

State 1

Local 1

Non-governmental 1

Which other counties, if any, had significant participation in the event?

State the date and time of when the incident, planned event, or exercise occurred:

01/01/2011

List all Federal, State, local, or tribal agencies involved in the incident, planned event, or exercise:

Briefly describe the incident, planned event, or exercise:

Indicate all communications technologies used in the incident, planned event, or exercise covered by this evaluation:

Part 2: Incident Selection Guidance

- Did the response involve multiple agencies and emergency response disciplines within one hour of the incident, planned event, or exercise? -
- Was the incident, planned event, or exercise managed under a National Incident Management System (NIMS)-compliant Incident Command System (ICS)? -
- Does sufficient documentation exist to provide for independent validation and verification of the adequacy of response-level emergency communications? -

Part 3: Secondary Evaluation Criteria

Common Policies & Procedures

SEC 1.1 Did policies and procedures exist for interagency communications between the involved jurisdictions, agencies, and disciplines? - **Answer Required**

SEC 1.2 Were they written? -

Success Factors, Challenges & Recommendations

Success Factors (Optional):

Challenges (Optional):

Recommendations (Optional):

SEC 2.1 Were established interagency communications policies and procedures followed throughout the incident, planned event, or exercise? - **Answer Required**

SEC 2.2 Did established policies and procedures exist between responding agencies for request, activation, accountability, deactivation, and problem resolution of deployable interagency communications resources, such as mobile communications centers, gateways, and radio caches? - **Answer Required**

SEC 2.3 If so, were they followed? [Information Only] -

Success Factors, Challenges & Recommendations

Success Factors (Optional):

Challenges (Optional):

Recommendations (Optional):

SEC 3.1 Were interagency communications policies and procedures across responding agencies consistent with NIMS?

- Answer Required

Success Factors, Challenges & Recommendations

Success Factors (Optional):

Challenges (Optional):

Recommendations (Optional):

SEC 4.1 Does a priority order exist for use of interagency communications resources (e.g., life safety before property protection)?

- Answer Required

SEC 4.2 Was this prioritization of communications resource use followed?

-

Success Factors, Challenges & Recommendations

Success Factors (Optional):

Challenges (Optional):

Recommendations (Optional):

SEC 5.1 Was a primary interagency communications talk path clearly established by procedures used during the incident, planned event, or exercise?

- Answer Required

SEC 5.2 If not, was such a talk path established ad hoc and communicated to responders early in the incident, planned event, or exercise?

- Answer Required

Success Factors, Challenges & Recommendations

Success Factors (Optional):

Challenges (Optional):

Recommendations (Optional):

SEC 6.1 Was plain language used throughout the incident, planned event, or exercise?

- Answer Required

SEC 6.2 Did any communications problems arise amongst the primary operational leadership due to a lack of common terminology?

- Answer Required

SEC 6.3 Did any communications problems arise amongst other response-level emergency personnel during the incident, planned event, or exercise due to a lack of common terminology?

- Answer Required

Success Factors, Challenges & Recommendations

Success Factors (Optional):

Challenges (Optional):

Recommendations (Optional):

SEC 7.1 Were clear unit identification procedures used amongst the primary operational leadership?

- Answer Required

SEC 7.2 Were clear unit identification procedures used amongst other response-level emergency personnel throughout the incident, planned event, or exercise?

- Answer Required

Success Factors, Challenges & Recommendations

Success Factors (Optional):

Challenges (Optional):

Recommendations (Optional):

SEC 8.1 Were common names used by all responding agencies for interagency communications channels?

- Answer Required

SEC 8.2 Were standard names as identified in the National Interoperability Field Operations Guide (NIFOG) used for Federal Communications Commission (FCC)-designated interoperability channels?

- Answer Required

Success Factors, Challenges & Recommendations

Success Factors (Optional):

Challenges (Optional):

Recommendations (Optional):

Responder Roles & Responsibilities

SEC 9.1 Did a single individual carry out the Operations Section Chief responsibilities in each operational period?

- Answer Required

Success Factors, Challenges & Recommendations

Success Factors (Optional):

Challenges (Optional):

Recommendations (Optional):

SEC 10.1 Did the Operations Section Chief directly manage more than seven subordinates at any time?

- Answer Required

SEC 10.2 Did first-level subordinates to the Operations Section Chief directly manage more than seven subordinates at any time?

- Answer Required

Success Factors, Challenges & Recommendations

Success Factors (Optional):

Challenges (Optional):

Recommendations (Optional):

SEC 11.1 Was the ICS COML position specifically filled during the incident, planned event, or exercise?

- Answer Required

SEC 11.2 Were COML roles and responsibilities carried out, either by the Incident Commander (or Unified Command), the COML, or another designee?

- Answer Required

SEC 11.3 Who by position or function carried out the responsibilities?

-

SEC 11.4 Were necessary communications resources effectively ordered?

-

SEC 11.5 Were they ordered using documented procedures?

-

SEC 11.6 Was a communications plan established by procedure or developed early in the incident, planned event, or exercise?

-

SEC 11.7 Did the communications plan meet the communications needs of the primary operational leadership? [Information only]

-

Success Factors, Challenges & Recommendations

Success Factors (Optional):

Challenges (Optional):

Recommendations (Optional):

Quality & Continuity

SEC 12.1 Were more than one out of every 10 transmissions repeated due to failure of initial communications attempts amongst the primary operational leadership?

- Answer Required

Success Factors, Challenges & Recommendations

Success Factors (Optional):

Challenges (Optional):

Recommendations (Optional):

SEC 13.1 Was a back-up resource available for communications amongst the primary operational leadership in case of failure of the primary mode? - **Answer Required**

SEC 13.2 Did the primary mode fail during the incident, planned event, or exercise at any time? [Information only] -

SEC 13.3 If so, was a back-up effectively provided? -

Success Factors, Challenges & Recommendations

Success Factors (Optional):

Challenges (Optional):

Recommendations (Optional):

SEC 14.1 Overall, was the primary operational leadership able to communicate adequately to manage resources during the incident, planned event, or exercise? - **Answer Required**

Success Factors, Challenges & Recommendations

Success Factors (Optional):

Challenges (Optional):

Recommendations (Optional):

Your form is incomplete. Please go back and complete the required questions.

Available Actions

[« Event Listing](#)

Page 18 of 18

Jump to:

Please contact NECPgoals@hq.dhs.gov if you have any questions.