

GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY & EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

HURRICANE ISAAC AFTER ACTION REPORT & IMPROVEMENT PLAN

DECEMBER 31, 2012



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Executive Summary

On the morning of August 21, 2012, Tropical Depression Nine formed in the Atlantic Ocean east of the Lesser Antilles and eventually strengthened into Tropical Storm Isaac. Isaac tracked through the eastern Caribbean Sea and into the Florida Straits with high-end tropical storm strength. Storm prediction models initially predicted a track along the west coast of Florida and then northeasterly




Isaac Track Montage (Courtesy of University of Wisconsin-Madison Cooperative Institute for Meteorological Satellite Studies)

toward the Florida Panhandle. Based on these predictions, hurricane warnings were posted on August 25 for the west coast of Florida. However, the storm followed a more northwest path toward the southeastern part of Louisiana and that area would eventually take the brunt of the storm as it escalated to Hurricane status.

On August 26, Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal declared a *State of Emergency*. On August 27, President Obama ordered federal aid to supplement Louisiana's state and local preparedness and response efforts.


Attributed in part from the improvements to the protective floodgates made by the US Army Corps, the majority of GOHSEP Region 1, with the exception of lower Plaquemines parish, experienced only hurricane force winds and escaped the extensive storm surge flooding other parts of Southeast Louisiana experienced. Hurricane Isaac's 8.4 foot storm surge pushed into St. John the Baptist parish flooding homes and businesses and prompting an intensive search and rescue operation More than 4,000 citizens were rescued from the flood waters with assistance from the Louisiana National Guard and the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries.

By August 30, water levels of the Tangipahoa River rose to threaten the Lake Tangipahoa Dam at Percy Quinn State Park in Mississippi. This caused resources to be reassigned and triggered other preparations for an evacuation in Tangipahoa Parish. Eventually, the water level was successfully pumped down reducing the threat of the feared dam failure. Due to the late storm track change, responders had a shortened time frame to prepare for the storm. There was a perceived low storm threat, attributed to the Saffir-Simpson Category 1 and subsequent Tropical Storm designation, leaving many residents to shelter-in-place and not foresee the true impacts of the storm. Hurricane Isaac produced more than 20 inches of rain in the most affected areas of the state. This level of rainfall caused several areas to flood, which had historically not been affected. Ultimately, the severe rainfall, level of storm surge along the coast and inland waterways, compounded by the systems slow



Storm total rainfall from Isaac from August 25 – September 3, 2012

progress through the state, forced the state to deal with issues above and beyond those expected from a Category 1 hurricane.



Six Regional After Action Conferences (AACs) were conducted between October 15 and November 8. Each of the GOHSEP Regions 1, 2, 3, and 9 participated in separate AACs. Regions 4, 5 and 6, 7, 8, respectively, were combined into two Super-Regions for the AACs. Local, state, federal and non-governmental agencies were present at all of the conferences.

The purpose of the After Action Conferences was to capture what occurred across the State of Louisiana during Hurricane Isaac and to identify strengths, challenges, trends and lessons learned.

The forums were not intended to address the performance of individuals, parishes or regions. While the detailed information gained from each region is presented separately in this AAR, all of the regional information is synthesized into one summary with an overarching improvement plan reflecting the most significant and common issues across the State. On November 29, this data was presented at the State Agencies' AAC to further assess the capability strengths, needs, and gaps between the State agencies, the regions, and other response and support entities. Likewise, the details of the State Agencies AAC have been included in this AAR.

This After-Action Report does not attempt to capture every issue at every level of government. The focus of this report is specifically on all major, overarching issues that can be addressed and corrected in preparation of future catastrophic events that may impact the State. This AAR is a tool to be utilized in the ongoing process of GOHSEP and all support agencies to continue to improve upon all capabilities related to the safety, health, and welfare of the citizens of Louisiana.

Successful Strategies

While this AAR focuses mainly on areas for improvement, there were many areas of sustainment recognized involving personnel, processes, organization and systems. The following are a few of the highlighted best practices mentioned during the AAR process:

- The activation of most local and state agency EOC's and coordination centers expedited the coordination and response operations for Hurricane Isaac.
- The expanded use of Social Media by response agencies has increased their ability to provide the public with information on storm conditions, protective actions to be taken and emergency alerts.
- GOHSEP's Regional Coordinators played a vital role in assisting regional officials to coordinate with state agencies and direct local response activities.
- GOHSEP should continue the coordination conference calls from the response phase throughout the recovery phase.

Primary Areas for Improvement

The following are the primary areas for improvement

- Response plans must be revised to focus more on the predicted effects of a storm rather than purely on the category of storm. A level of flexibility needs to be added to current plans to expedite response operations in situation where a storm develops quickly or the track change.
- Additional Web EOC training is needed for local and state personnel. The current status of a request needs to be included in Web EOC.
- Local officials need to be notified and coordinated with prior to the release of public warnings, or any state actions that will take place in their jurisdiction.
- Social media is becoming a key piece of the public information and warning system for many local and state agencies. All stakeholders need to ensure that plans and procedures are in place for utilizing social media as an additional resource.
- Mass care plans need to be revised to address the increasing level of medical support for all shelters and affected populations.
- Increased coordination is needed between state and local officials regarding the decision to open a POD or PODs, the amount of commodities that will be needed for each site, and where they will be located.
- Improved coordination and planning is needed between state and local agencies regarding DSNAP operations. Special attention needs to be paid to security, staffing and operational flow of the sites.
- Local and state officials should work with FEMA and GSA to develop a list of facilities that meet the criteria for a DRC.

The following sections capture an overview of the information discussed at the six regional conferences and the state agency conference. More detailed and specific information provided in those conferences can be found in the regional Improvement Plan Matrices found in Appendix 1 and the combined state Improvement Plan Matrix found in Appendix 2.

Hurricane Isaac Regional Summaries

Region 1



Participants complimented state agencies for their support in mass care and transportation. Jefferson Parish noted the level of support that state personnel provided exceeded their expectations.

Conference participants, at the state and local level, noted the need to rewrite all existing plans to focus on a storm's predicted impact rather than just category, with special emphasis placed on

storm surge and SLOSH modeling.

Due to late changes in the storm's track, facilities were quickly set up for sheltering and support was provided for evacuating the special needs population. Federal partners responded quickly to a request for assistance and established a Federal Medical Station (FMS) at the Morial Convention Center in coordination with the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals. State and local officials cited the need for developing an additional shelter category to include the population that has a higher need of medical support than the general population but is not quite considered special needs.

Local officials agreed that GOHSEP's conference calls were very helpful and that social media was a great asset, however the capability of social media is becoming an expectation and requires dedicated personnel.

Representatives from Region 1, complimented LANG personnel for their support but noted a need to be able to coordinate directly with the units assigned to their jurisdiction instead of submitting additional mission requests in Web EOC. Currently, all tasking has to be done in Web EOC and then processed through LANG's command and control structure. Regional officials also requested a way to check on the status of any and all of their request in Web EOC.

Participants stated the need to adjust state and local recovery plans to focus more on resiliency and getting businesses back in operation. In terms of citizen support, the FEMA EOC representatives were praised but local officials noted a lack of coordination with FEMA and GSA when DRC sites were selected. It was also noted the need for improved coordination with state agencies in establishing and operating the DSNAP locations. Lastly, the IA / PA and transitional housing processes need improvements.

Participating Agencies:

- Crescent City Connection Police Department
- Federal Emergency Management Agency
- Jefferson Parish Fire Communications
- Jefferson Parish Office of Emergency Preparedness
- Jefferson Parish Public Information Officer
- Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office

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- New Orleans Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
- Louisiana Department of Agriculture and Fisheries
- Louisiana Department of Child and Family Services
- Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals Office of Public Health Region 1
- Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals
- Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries Enforcement Division
- Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development
- · Louisiana Governor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
- Louisiana National Guard
- Louisiana State Police
- National Weather Service
- Plaquemines Parish Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
- St. Bernard Parish Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
- West Jefferson Parish Medical Center Emergency Medical Services

After Action Discussion Points

CATASTROPHIC STORM SURGE ISSUES

• Plans should not be based solely on Saffir -Simpson scale hurricane categories to include all of the sheltering point-to-point agreements.

PODS

- Overall coordination for the initiation of PODs and tracking commodities were issues for the region.
- There must be a policy in place for opening a POD. There were PODs opened that were not requested and other sites were operating in areas where there were stores and electricity.
- Parishes must have visibility on the arrival times of the commodities in the PODs. In some instances the commodities arrived at the POD sites before personnel arrived while in other areas there were significant delays in getting the resources that were requested.

TRANSPORTATION

• Communications with drivers for state buses became an issue during the evacuation. A better plan must be produced for communicating with bus drivers.

SHELTERING

- We must enhance the local sheltering efforts and identify sites and additional trained shelter staff to operated and manage shelters.
- State and local emergency managers must develop a plan for those citizens who do not qualify for a medical special needs shelter but have functional and access needs that cannot be met in a regular shelter. The major issue is power supply for those citizens who are oxygen dependent.

• Safe housing for first responders was discussed to protect them as the storm passes over. Develop "safe house" planning and capabilities for first responders.

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

- Must establish a better battle rhythm between state and local partners for coordination of conference call times and durations.
- Web EOC requests were denied without any explanation. Web EOC users must follow up with requestors and provide some explanation as to why a resource cannot or will not be provided. More Web EOC training can also be utilized.

COMMUNICATIONS

- Talk groups assigned for use during Isaac were being used by other personnel not involved in response efforts. Communications plan needs to be reviewed and updated to confirm channels are assigned appropriately.
- 911 communications failed with the loss of local AT&T pedestal battery life. Development of plan to include backup generators to continue operations is needed.

PUBLIC INFORMATION

- The use of social media was an overall success. Parishes utilized Facebook and Twitter to provide updates to their citizens.
- Maximize the JIC/JIS for all public information. IA/PA information to be released to the public was not sent to local parish government by FEMA beforehand.

DNSAP

• DCFS must incorporate local representatives in the planning and decision making process for a DSNAP operation. There must be a coordinated plan in place before an event that all stakeholders should agree to follow.

DRCs

• There were issues with FEMA and GSA on site selection for the DRCs. Parishes would like to know if there is any way to work with GSA to have sites pre-approved to potentially serve as a DRC in future events.



Region 2

Participants from Region 2 concentrated primarily on the preparation and recovery phases during discussions at the After Action Conference. The preparedness focus was on coordination among local, State, and Red Cross officials regarding shelter operations and security. It was noted the prestorm information sharing went well, but as the incident progressed there was confusion on which shelters remained open and who was responsible for security at the shelters. The

region noted that, although their evacuation plans were not extensively tested, they felt sufficiently prepared for any eventuality.

During the response phase, the region had no issues with emergency declarations, communications, WebEOC requests, or activating the EOCs. Parish officials did note that they are still having difficulty in getting information about the more rural areas out to the public using major media outlets. In reaction, officials indicated that they are increasingly relying on alternative systems, such as social media, to provide information to the public. The region had no mass care or Search and Rescue issues.

At the time of this conference, the Recovery phase was ongoing, but officials had no issues to report in regards to the Disaster Recovery Centers, Preliminary Damage Assessment Teams or extending their parish emergency declarations. Participants did note that coordination and communication regarding the DSNAP site selection and when the sites would be opening was as an area for improvement.

Participating Agencies:

- Ascension Parish Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
- Capital Area Human Service District
- Earl K. Long Hospital
- East Baton Rouge Mayor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
- East Feliciana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
- Iberville Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
- Livingston Parish Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
- · Louisiana Governor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
- Louisiana Department of Agriculture and Forestry
- Louisiana Department of Child and Family Services
- Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality
- Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals Office of Public Health
- Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries Enforcement Division
- Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development
- Louisiana State Police
- Point Coupee Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
- Region 2 Hospitals
- West Baton Rouge Office of Emergency Preparedness
- West Feliciana Office of Emergency Preparedness

After Action Conference Discussion Points

PODs

• Must be a policy in place for opening a POD. There were PODs opened that were not requested and other sites were operating in areas where there were stores and electricity.

SHELTERING

- We must enhance the local sheltering efforts and identify sites and additional trained shelter staff to operate and manage shelters. Communication must improve between local government and private agencies such as the American Red Cross.
- Many shelters, such as ARC sponsored shelters, do not conduct background checks on residents. Assure that security is addressed in shelter plans.
- Some parishes currently have schools identified as shelters. Collaboration with other parishes is suggested to develop a list of secondary locations for evacuees.

PUBLIC INFORMATION

- The use of social media was an overall success. Parishes utilized Facebook and Twitter to provide updates to their citizens.
- Local news sources were reporting inaccurate storm information and not reporting on the briefings that parish officials were providing on the smaller population centers. Plans need to be developed to assign an ESF-15 POC to assist the parishes in coordinating with the media to disseminate the correction information to the public.

DNSAP

- The operation of the DSNAP sites in region 2 was successful by using collaborative efforts of local government and law enforcement, identifying multiple locations for use as DSNAP sites and developing plans for each location.
- DCFS must incorporate local representatives in the planning and decision making process for any DSNAP operation. There must be a coordinated plan in place before an event that all stakeholders should agree to follow.

Region 3

Region 3's overarching issue was the need for better storm impact analysis. There was a perceived nominal risk by the Region 3 population, because of the low storm category. When the storm impact models adjusted to the changed storm path, the threat of flooding required last minute evacuations.

Conference participants reported, that although the conference calls were very helpful, they need to be shortened so that they do not interfere with local planning efforts. Representatives uniformly

agreed that social media has become a vital part of their public information system and noted it was a major strength during this response.

It was noted that some of the shelters' occupancy load were decreased at the last minute significantly changing the evacuee capacity of pre-designated shelters. The hasty evacuation of flooded areas caused an additional challenge of tracking and accounting for residents of the affected areas and triggered repeat search and rescue missions.

Another common discussion point was the WebEOC visibility issue of tracking requests. For example, when power was lost 20 hours after the storm due to late flooding that impacted 4000 residents, officials noted that a WebEOC request for pumps was closed out without all tasks being completed.

It was noted that the method for operating PODs varies within the region. Most parish directors prefer commodities be delivered directly to the POD sites while at least one parish requests delivery to a central point for distribution by local resources. It was suggested that a regional coordination meeting be held to improve this capability and build a regional POD plan.

Participants noted a lack of coordination with FEMA and GSA when DRC sites were selected. There was also requests for improved coordination with DCFS in establishing and operating the DSNAP locations.

Participating Agencies:

- American Red Cross
- Assumption Parish Office of Emergency Preparedness
- City of Thibodaux
- Federal Emergency Management Agency
- Lafourche Parish Office of Emergency Preparedness
- Louisiana Department of Agriculture and Forestry
- Louisiana Department of Child and Family Services
- · Louisiana Governor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
- Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals
- Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries Enforcement Division
- Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development
- Louisiana National Guard



- Louisiana State Police
- National Weather Service
- Ochsner- St. Anne Hospital
- Region 3 Hospitals
- St. Charles Parish Office of Emergency Preparedness
- St. James Parish Office of Emergency Preparedness
- St. James Parish Sheriff's Office
- St. John the Baptist Parish Office of Emergency Preparedness
- Terrebonne Parish Office of Emergency Preparedness

After Action Conference Discussion Points

The use of social media was an overall success. Parishes utilized Facebook and Twitter to provide updates to their citizens.

CATASTROPHIC STORM SURGE ISSUES

- Plans should not be based solely on Saffir -Simpson scale hurricane categories to include all of the sheltering point-to-point agreements.
- Must develop local plans for Search and Rescue to include a system to track and triage those citizens being rescued from flood waters. Many SAR missions were duplicated because there was no documentation of the rescue. While suspending registration and triage may save time, it put citizen lives at risk and wasted valuable time and resources.

PODs

- Overall coordination for the initiation of PODs and tracking commodities were issues for the region.
- Must be a policy in place for opening a POD. There were PODs opened that were not requested and other sites were operating in areas where there were stores and electricity.
- Parishes must have visibility on the arrival times of the commodities in the PODs. In some instances the commodities arrived at the POD sites before personnel arrived while in other areas there were significant delays in getting the resources that were requested.

TRANSPORTATION

- Department of Education was trying to secure school bus assets for the state mission directly from each local school board without notifying the parish OEP director. These assets are a part of local planning efforts, and the OEP must know if they being asked to become a part of the State mission.
- With the SAR mission, the parish did have a plan in place to utilize school buses but needed drivers.

SHELTERING

- We must enhance the local sheltering efforts and identify sites and additional trained shelter staff to operated and manage shelters
- Must develop a plan for those citizens who do not qualify for a medical special needs shelter but have functional and access needs that cannot be met in a regular shelter. Major issue is power supply for those citizens who are oxygen dependent.
- During the response, the State Fire Marshall conducted assessments of the shelters and drastically reduced the planned capacity. ESF 6 stakeholders, both local and state, must coordinate with the Fire Marshall to negotiate shelter capacity before an event.

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

- Must establish a better battle rhythm between state and local partners for coordination of conference call times and durations.
- Web EOC requests were denied without any explanation. Web EOC users must follow up with requestors and provide some explanation as to why a resource cannot or will not be provided.

COMMUNICATIONS

- State communication towers lost internet connectivity to the master site. 3 of the 7 state communication towers in Region 3 were inoperable.
- All radios were locked on that one site or were scanning for the next available tower. Users could only talk to radios affiliated with that alternate tower. Install microwave back haul and eliminate the internet capabilities on all the towers below I-10/I-12.

DNSAP

- Communication and coordination between DCFS and local emergency management directors was not adequate. Parishes had little to no input on the sites, resources or the process that was put in place to distribute benefits and in some instances were only notified hours before the sites were opened.
- DCFS must incorporate local representatives in the planning and decision making process for a DSNAP operation. There must be a coordinated plan in place before an event that all stakeholders should agree to follow.

DRCs

• There were issues with FEMA and GSA on site selection for the DRCs. Parishes would like to know if there is any way to work with GSA to have sites pre-approved to potentially serve as a DRC in future events.

Regions 4 and 5



New local government officials in this region were unfamiliar with the declaration process and the importance of declaring as a precaution. The request for a better conference call schedule was requested due to time commitments focusing on the most affected parishes first. Shelter planning and preparedness raised questions regarding the pre-

storm designation and qualification of facilities that will be used as shelters. SEOC ESFs contacting parish personnel and requesting the same set of data multiple times slowed parishes from focusing on the mission at hand. Participants noted that most gas stations along the hurricane evacuation route quickly ran out of fuel without a way to resupply during the response. Parish officials stated the need to reevaluate their planning to address slow moving storms. State issued press releases created some conflicting information, specifically pertaining to "boil water" advisories, IA/PA briefings, DSNAP and DRC operations.

Participating Agencies:

- Acadia Parish Office of Emergency Preparedness
- American Red Cross
- Calcasieu Parish Medical
- Calcasieu Parish Police Jury
- ESF 8- Hospital Coordinator
- Evangeline Parish Office of Emergency Preparedness
- Federal Emergency Management Agency
- Iberia Parish Office of Emergency Preparedness
- Jefferson Davis Office of Emergency Preparedness
- Lafayette Parish Office of Emergency Preparedness
- Louisiana National Guard
- Louisiana Department of Agriculture and Forestry
- Louisiana Department of Child and Family Services
- Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals Office of Public Health
- Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries Enforcement Division
- Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development
- Louisiana Governor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
- Louisiana State Police
- St. Landry Parish Office of Emergency Preparedness
- St. Martin Parish Office of Emergency Preparedness
- St. Mary Parish Office of Emergency Preparedness
- Vermilion Parish Office of Emergency Preparedness

After Action Conference Discussion Points

TRANSPORTATION

- Buses used for evacuation in the lower southeast parishes were staged in a southwest parish. The parish OHSEP was not notified of the pre-staging.
- Gas stations quickly ran out of fuel along the hurricane evacuation route with no emergency plan to delivery more.
- Consider MOUs with alternate refueling options.

SHELTERING

- We must enhance the local sheltering efforts and identify sites and additional trained shelter staff to operated and manage shelters
- Shelters in most parishes are not rated for hurricane force winds. Regions need to collaborate to identify other suitable shelters if necessary.

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

- State ESF leads were contacting local and parish agencies for information already relayed through conference calls or a parish update in Web EOC.
- Information relayed during conference calls needs to be relayed to the state ESFs, so parishes can focus on the issue at hand.
- All deployment requests and fulfillments need to be tracked through Web EOC.

CONFERENCE CALLS

• Condensing and focusing conference calls to most affected areas first would allow for better time management.

PUBLIC INFORMATION

- Lack of communication between parishes and state agencies caused confusion within the parish when relaying information regarding boil advisories, DSNAP location and other programs.
- Policies need to be developed to include parish OEP directors and officials prior to the public release of information regarding their jurisdictions.

DNSAP

- Communication and coordination between DCFS and local emergency management directors was not adequate. DCFS provided inaccurate information about DSNAP locations.
- DCFS must incorporate local representatives in the planning and decision making process for a DSNAP operation. There must be a coordinated plan in place before an event that all stakeholders should agree to follow.

PUBLIC ASSISTANCE/INDIVIDUAL ASSISTANCE

- Parishes were unsure of the process to request an applicant briefing and dates for their parish's kick off meeting.
- Communicate more effectively to ensure parish OHSEP directors understand the process for requesting and the dates of future recovery meetings.

Regions 6, 7 & 8



and infrastructure.

While these regions may not be at risk for storm surge like many of the coastal communities, they are certainly the mainstay of Louisiana's evacuation and sheltering plans. In almost every major hurricane threat to Louisiana, coastal communities do not have enough suitable shelter capacity within the parish outside of the projected storm surge areas. These inland communities support residents from the evacuation area often putting a strain on their own resources

Regions 6, 7, and 8 played a major role in sheltering residents from the more vulnerable areas. Due to last minute changes in the storms direction, the decision to activate the state's shelter plan was made later than normal and caused some confusion which resulted in more shelters being opened than needed. Participants noted that shelter plans were not followed for a variety of reasons and tracking shelter openings and occupancy levels was difficult. Participants requested the development of standard definitions and procedures to report shelter status, capacity and resources. Operations in the state managed shelters ran well but additional planning is needed to manage and store donations at each location.

Representatives noted that there were issues with Web EOC requests. Multiple requests were cancelled or closed out in Web EOC without any explanation or the mission being completed.

Participating Agencies

- American Red Cross
- Caddo Bossier Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
- East Carroll Parish Office of Emergency Preparedness
- Jackson Parish Office of Emergency Preparedness
- LaSalle Parish Office of Emergency Preparedness
- Lincoln Parish Office of Emergency Preparedness
- Louisiana National Guard
- Louisiana Department of Child and Family Services
- Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals
- Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals Office of Public Health
- Louisiana Department of Agriculture and Forestry
- Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries
- Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development
- · Louisiana Governor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
- Louisiana State Fire Marshal's office
- Louisiana State Police
- Monroe Regional Medical
- Natchitoches Parish Sheriff's Office
- National Weather Service
- Ouachita Parish Office of Emergency Preparedness

- Rapides Parish Office of Emergency Preparedness
- Region 6 Hospitals
- Region 7 Hospitals
- Region 8 Hospitals
- United Way 2-1-1
- United Way of Central Louisiana
- West Carroll Parish Office of Emergency Preparedness
- West Monroe Police

After Action Conference Discussion Points

SHELTER PLANS

- Established shelter plans were not followed. These exceptions caused major issues for all support agencies and the local emergency management community. Citizens with their own transportation were allowed to enter into shelters that were originally only planned for the Critical Transportation Needs (CTN) population. All plans for wrap around services such as parking, feeding, security and medical support had to be amended.
- There was an established sequence of fill that was not utilized for this event. The number of shelters that were activated, put on standby or requested to be opened did not match the perceived threat or hazard. Parishes felt pressure to open all shelters in their region with little to no justification. This led to wasted resources and expenses to the state.
- Many shelter plans to include many of the point-to-point agreements are based on a Category 3 hurricane or higher. Plans should be amended to account for all hazards and threats associated with a storm and not just on wind speed. There are still some point-to-point agreements that have not been signed by the evacuating and/or host parishes. These agreements should be finalized as soon as possible.

INFORMATION SHARING

- Host parishes cited an overall lack of information and coordination on shelter information such as their openings, wrap around resources needed, anticipated populations etc.
- There was no DCFS representative present in the Rapides Parish EOC. There must be a DCFS representative in all parishes that have a large state sponsored shelter.

MANAGEMENT OF EXPECTATIONS

- There was an overall lack of expectations about emergency evacuation shelters and the resources provided in the facility.
- Both the evacuees and state leadership should be familiarized with the resources available and planned for in an emergency shelter.

WEB EOC

- DCFS must enter shelter openings in Web EOC as a resource request, so that all support agencies can be tasked accordingly and for situational awareness.
- Resource requests were deleted or cancelled with no explanation given in the system.

REENTRY

• The established reentry plan must be followed in future evacuation events. Both the home and the host parishes should have time to prepare for the citizens reentry.


MEDICAL SUPPORT

- Citizens must be triaged when coming from flood waters or a search and rescue situations. There were instances cited that put medically fragile citizens in very unstable or life threatening situations.
- Must enhance the medical support and monitoring at all sheltering facilities to include a better plan for providing prescription medication.

SHELTER SECURITY

• Must revisit the site security plan for each planned shelter facility and make changed where necessary.

Region 9



The preparedness focus for Region 9 was communication and coordination shortfalls regarding opening shelters. Shelter plans, to include the decision process to open special needs shelters, must be reevaluated.

During the response phase, the region had no issues with emergency declarations, communications, Web EOC requests, or activating the EOCs. All parish representatives reported that the GOHSEP conference calls were beneficial and a major strength during Hurricane Isaac. Parishes were not notified of local boil water advisories prior to the press release being issued to the public. Officials requested better coordination with state partners for better information flow in the future. Local officials mentioned need to reevaluate plans for POD site openings.

At the time of this conference, the recovery phase was still underway. Regional officials noted that a major area for improvement is increasing the coordination during the planning and operation of the DSNAP sites. Local officials reported that Preliminary Damage Assessment teams were very effective and there were no issues or need for improvement regarding extending their parish emergency declarations. Participants discussed the need for better planning and coordination with their federal partners in selecting sites for use as DRCs.

Participating Agencies:

- Acadian Ambulance
- American Red Cross
- Federal Emergency Management Agency
- Louisiana Department of Agriculture and Forestry
- Louisiana Department of Child and Family Services
- Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals Region 9 Hospitals
- Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals Office of Public Health
- Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development
- · Louisiana Governor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
- Louisiana National Guard
- Louisiana State Police
- National Weather Service
- St. Helena Parish Office of Emergency Preparedness
- St. Tammany Parish Office of Emergency Preparedness
- Tangipahoa Parish Office of Emergency Preparedness
- Washington Parish Office of Emergency Preparedness

After Action Discussion Points

PODS

- Overall coordination for the initiation of PODs and tracking commodities were issues for the region.
- Parishes should reevaluate EOP for POD openings and focus on PODS only where needed.

Sheltering

- We must enhance the local sheltering efforts and identify sites and additional trained shelter staff to operated and manage shelters.
- Educate parish officials on state sheltering plan and the trigger points for opening a special needs shelter.
- Evaluate shelter plans to be based on need, rather than category of the storm.
- Must develop a plan for those citizens who do not qualify for a medical special needs shelter but have functional and access needs that cannot be met in a regular shelter. Major issue is power supply for those citizens who are oxygen dependent.

Public Information

- Information regarding boil advisories was released to the public before given to the affected parish.
- Parishes request that information be sent to them prior to a media release.

DNSAP

- Communication and coordination between DCFS and local emergency management directors prior to opening was not adequate. Parishes had little to no notice on when the sites would open.
- DCFS must incorporate local representatives in the planning and decision making process for a DSNAP operation. There must be a coordinated plan in place before an event that all stakeholders should agree to follow.

DRCs

• There were issues with FEMA and GSA on site selection for the DRCs. Parishes would like to coordinate with GSA to have sites pre-approved to potentially serve as a DRC in future events.

State Agencies

On November 29, the GOHSEP Emergency Operations Center staff hosted the State Agency After Action Conference in the State EOC.

During the state conference, the branch managers focused on the preparedness, response, and recovery phases for Hurricane Isaac. The preparedness discussions centered on the need to update and revise existing EOPs, the content and effectiveness of both the quarterly ESF meetings and Web EOC training. State agencies discussed the notification process and time line for activating the SEOC during a response. The depth of knowledge and training of the ESF staff, the content and timing of the shift change briefings, available workspace, and mission processing in Web EOC were also examined. The recovery phase discussion concentrated on the effectiveness of the post storm assessments, deactivation of the SEOC, mission support for DSNAP and level of support from local and state organizations for the DRCs.

After Action Discussion Points

Preparedness

Plans

- All planning assumptions should no longer be based solely on the Saffir-Simpson Scale hurricane Category 3 or above. Plans must be developed for all hazards and regardless of size or scope.
- Additional H Hour planning must be conducted to take into account a storm that develops quickly or changes course without 5 days to prepare a response.
- While planning efforts before Hurricane Isaac were thought to be sufficient, the plans were not followed during this event. The blended shelter concept was not an ideal situation. If drive ups may be allowed in CTNS in the future, all planning assumptions need to be revised.
- State agencies must review and update the state EOP, Supplement 6 and all supporting documents.
- Must develop a comprehensive State Feeding Plan with all partners involved to include Louisiana Workforce Commission, VOAD, American Red Cross and Salvation Army.
- Should develop a plan to provide accurate and timely information to 211 partners and the JIC so that citizens can be better informed.

Quarterly ESF Meetings

• State agencies reported that overall these meetings are adequate but should focus on a central topic rather than just agency updates.

Web EOC

• Overall ESF representatives stated the need to have more Web EOC training for state EOP staff and their individual EOC staff members.

Coordination with Parishes

- The GOHSEP regional coordinators are a great asset to the all emergency management partners.
- State agencies should limit their direct contact with parish OEP directors and should make initial contact with the regional coordinator.

Response

Social Media

• Social media was proven to be a valuable tool that enhanced our response efforts and our ability to provide rapid information to citizens. These assets should be included in all future plans, training and exercises.

Conference Calls

• The conference call provided valuable information and should be continued in all future responses.

State EOC Representatives

- EOC representatives from state agencies must be decisions makers or able to make instant contact with senior level leadership.
- Must reevaluate the seating in the EOC. NWS needs a seat, and VOAD may need additional staff.

Information Sharing

- There must be one coordinated shelter list and population report that is disseminated to all stakeholders. This information must be vetted by American Red Cross, GOHSEP and the Department of Children and Family Services and provided to 211 and the JIC.
- Rumor control continues to be a major issue for agencies. Must develop a plan to validate information so that we don't waste valuable response time and effort.
- Information given on the conference calls should be sent to all partners and pushed to ESF leads to eliminate multiple calls to parishes.

Web EOC

- Missions were initially assigned to the wrong branch or agency. We must conduct better training and quick reference lists for the loggers and taskers.
- Web EOC requests made by individuals on behalf of other entities caused duplications and wasted time.

- Missions and tasks were not being updated in a timely manner. All agencies must commit to adding regular updates on all mission and tasks in Web EOC to provide the requester with current situational awareness.
- Some Web EOC requests were incomplete and did not provide enough information. Loggers and taskers should ensure that the resource request fully defines the mission and includes the who, what, when, where, why and how.

GIS and Demographic Data

- Stakeholders reported that politics and political leaders sometimes negatively affected the response, and they had to provide resources to entities that may not have asked for nor needed the assets.
- We must better utilize GIS data and demographics to support the decision making process. We must base response efforts on solid data and demographics in order to eliminate cost and confusion.

Workspace

• GOHSEP will reevaluate the facility layout and will make sure all agencies have adequate planning and ESF working rooms. Agencies will have more appropriate planning space other than the kitchen.

Search and Rescue

- Web EOC and the existing support system in place could not keep up with the amount of requests for Search and Rescue missions. We must develop an alternative method to expedite response efforts, eliminate duplicate missions and update all stakeholders of the progress and status all tasks.
- Plans for hasty evacuations and SAR missions must be followed. During the water rescue mission in St. John the Baptist Parish, evacuee registration and triage was suspended. All evacuees must be properly assessed in order to develop the best possible sheltering destination and those with medical needs can be sent to the appropriate medical facility.

Recovery

Reentry

• The established reentry plan was not followed for the Critical Transportation Need Evacuees. We must ensure that all partners are both ready to send the evacuees and to receive them before we launch the buses back to their home parishes.

DSNAP

• This was major recovery effort for all state partners at the state and local levels. There were no adequate plans or procedures in place to ensure proper site identification, notification to all stakeholders, anticipate actual resource needs and conduct crowd control. A plan must be developed with all partners that could potentially be involved and agree to be followed during all future DSNAP operations. • Expenses incurred during DSNAP operations are not reimbursable under the FEMA Stafford Act. This is a program administered by the USDA and expenses are only covered up to 50%. State agencies responded to resource requests from DCFS under the presumption of their emergency support functions without being aware of this information. DCFS must develop a reimbursement mechanism and protocol with the Division of Administration that will allow for all support agencies to be reimbursed for their services.

DRCs

- State and local emergency mangers and recovery experts should develop a list of potential facilities that may be utilized as a DRC in future disasters.
- Disaster Recovery Specialist should coordinate with GSA to obtain the site criteria before identifying locations for a DRC.

Conclusion

Although Hurricane Isaac was not the largest or most powerful storm to ever affect Louisiana, it did present the state with a unique set of challenges. During this after action review process, all stakeholders were able to review their actions during the preparedness, response and recovery phases of this event. The outcome of this analysis is a set of key strengths and clearly defined areas for improvement.

The extent of planning and preparation efforts currently underway throughout the state and between stakeholders was evident during this review process. The recommendations associated with the capabilities examined during this process are captured throughout this after-action report (AAR) and in the following improvement plan (IP) matrix. The IP matrix will provide guidance for making the identified improvements.

Appendix 1: Regional Improvement Plans

Region 1 Improvement Plan

Activity	Issue	Analysis	Recommendation /Corrective Action	Primary Responsible Agency / POC
Evacuation Planning	 1.1 Due to category of the storm and increased levee protection most citizens were complacent and sheltered in place. 1.2 Lack of communication with evacuation buses once they were deployed 	Most residents sheltered in place due to the category of the storm and increased levee protection. This will likely be the more common scenario for this region in the future. Jefferson Parish noted that getting buses from State went well but they had no direct communication with the drivers.	Local plans to shelter in place must be as defined as evacuation plans. Parishes should develop post storm evacuation plans. Buses need radios or other means of communication.	Parish OEP
Shelter Planning and Identification	2.1 The State Shelter Plan requires a minimum of Category 3 to open state shelters.	This storm changed course late, and based on the category, shelters were not, by plan, open to support evacuees. The cascading affects due to the storm caused the need to open shelters within the region.	Address planning to open shelters and advise evacuation or shelter in place based on SLOSH / storm surge and other factors, not solely on storm category.	
	2.2 Housing for first responders during an emergency	Parishes are challenged to provide adequate housing to first responders during a mandatory evacuation.	Develop plans to provide a housing alternative for first responders during a declared emergency, so they can continue to respond but have a safe, dry place to sleep.	
	2.3 Need to plan for evacuees that require a higher level of medical support than provided in general population shelters but do not meet the criteria to be admitted in the Medical Special Needs Shelter.	There is a portion of the population who require a level of medical support below what is characterized as medical special needs but exceeds the capabilities available at a general population shelter.	Many of those in this situation only need oxygen power stations or electricity. Additional plans should be developed to cover the medical needs of this population.	

Activity	Issue	Analysis	Recommendation /Corrective Action	Primary Responsible Agency / POC
Emergency Response Commodities	3.1 Parishes could not track commodities that were scheduled to arrive or requested for each POD location.	Parishes were initially notified of commodities and other resources being dispatched but did not have a system in place to for them to check on the status of the commodities once in route.	Create a process to get real time status of en route commodities and to be able to provide guidance information for travel into affected areas.	
	3.2 Grocery stores and pharmacies were unable to restock after the storm because of their regular delivery schedules.	Grocery and pharmacy supplies are delivered on a specific day of the week. If a storm falls on the restock day, local businesses are not able to replenish supplies quickly.	Parish OEP directors should work with the private sector to develop a list of critical supplies and assist them in developing a vital business COOP plan for emergency situations.	
Military Support from LANG	4.1 The chain of command and process to redirect LANG personnel support was an issue for parishes.	Once LANG arrived in parishes to support a specific mission, any changes to their tactical orders had to be resubmitted through Web EOC and approved by LANG JOC. This was a very cumbersome and time consuming process.	Parishes request a plan to streamline this process and utilize their local LANG LNO to approve changes to tactical missions.	
Parish EOC activation, manning, and declarations	5. 1 FEMA representatives in the local EOC were an asset for recovery operations but arrived too late in the process.	Requesting same FEMA rep's in local EOC's to continue to foster relationships and maintain support processes. They should arrive at the EOC during the response and not just during the recovery phase.	FEMA rep's should be in EOC's as early as possible to begin planning and execution of recovery operations such as DRC, IA/PA.	
Web EOC requests and issues	6.1 Parishes did not rely on Web EOC alone and feel they need to follow up with phone calls to	Some parishes entered their requests in Web EOC and then made connections to specific POC's at the SEOC to verify their request and get status updates.	Utilize liaisons to provide feedback on status of requests; conduct Web EOC specific exercises;	

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GOHSEP leadership.	train SEOC Branch	
There is an overall lack of	Managers to update	
confidence in the system.	ongoing missions as	
	frequently as possible.	

Activity	Issue	Analysis	Recommendation /Corrective Action	Primary Responsible Agency / POC
	6.2 Web EOC Requests were prematurely closed out before entire mission requests were satisfied.	Web EOC requests for missions that included multiple tasks were closed out without completing the entire mission. SEOC Branch Managers are tasked with breaking down the request and assigning to appropriate ESFs.	Conduct Web EOC specific training and exercises with local and SEOC managers on the process to complete or close a request.	
	6.3 Web EOC users do not provide regular situational awareness of mission status.	The parishes would like to know the status of their requests, and/or be updated as to what progress is being made; would like to be able to track all tasks that are associated with the overall mission.	Branch managers should provide timely and accurate updates on all open missions. Conduct Web EOC specific exercises and training with SEOC representative.	
Communications	7.1 Plaquemines Parish couldn't keep communication sites operational due to the lack of propane for generators.	Plaquemines Parish reported they could not get propane supplies refilled to keep generators running for communications sites.	Parishes should work with local vendors to pre-stage an appropriate propane supply or identify other resources to maintain communications.	
	7.2 The Plaquemines parish request for communications support was extremely delayed.	The decision to deploy a PCOM to the parish took entirely too long. Once equipment arrived, it was not fully operational.	Expedite decisions to deploy communication equipment and ensure that it is completely operational upon arrival.	
	7.3 AT&T pedestals batteries failed; no backup generators or generators not working	AT&T pedestals battery / generator failure caused 911 lines to fail. AT&T would not send repair crews citing hazardous conditions.	Develop task forces with needed assets to support / protect AT&T repair crews.	
	7.4 State pre-assigned talk groups for emergencies were being used for other events.	Plaquemines Parish stated their state assigned talk groups were being shared / used by assets at the LSU Football game	Review channel assignments; update plans	

Activity	Issue	Analysis	Recommendation /Corrective Action	Primary Responsible Agency / POC
Public Information	8.1 Social Media worked well but required constant attention to keep information updated.	Social media seemed to be a successful and significant asset in all areas, however once utilized it sets an expectation for the future. Requires full time dedicated position during activation of EOC Op's	Designate, in the EOP, a dedicated position added to the JIC/PIO to address social media demands; Include this position in future exercises.	
	8.2 Share public information originating from state or federal agencies with Parishes / Regions prior to release	FEMA released public information about IA/PA prior to the Parishes knowing about it. This adversely affected the Parish operations and local public relations	Maximize the concept of a JIC for all public information; include information regarding IA/PA on Hurricane Task Force Conference calls.	
Mass Care	9.1 Lack of Security and Medical personnel to support mass care efforts within the region	Parishes should push to a more regional approach for additional support instead of only having the state contingency plan when focusing on issues such as medical support. Medical providers are an important part of the community and the regions may get more participation from them than the State has in the past. This must be a team effort.	Reevaluate mass care plans to reflect regional coordination in mass care efforts.	
	9.2 Registration personnel were not confirming correct addresses of evacuees	Shelter personnel should have confirmed the information pulled from evacuees' drivers licenses was correct. It was impossible to determine how many citizens were from each parish during the reentry process. This made planning for post event shelter capacity and the appropriate number and type of transportation vehicles for the return trip very difficult.	Train registration personnel to update personal information for each evacuee.	

Activity	Issue	Analysis	Recommendation /Corrective Action	Primary Responsible Agency / POC
	9.3 Nursing Homes / Assisted Living facilities requested backup generators from local officials	Need to improve the capabilities of nursing homes / assisted living facilities for backup generators. There are currently only mandates for Nursing Homes regarding Emergency Operations Plans.	Major planning and organization efforts are needed between the Department of Health and Hospitals and other stakeholders to determine how generators can be made available.	
	9.4 Lack of mental health professionals available in shelters for crisis counseling.	Local and state officials noted the need to reach out to the medical community to increase support for mental health assets in shelters	Plans and asset lists need to be developed to include placing additional mental health professionals in shelters. Consider CERT / Medical Reserve Corp	
Search and Rescue	10.1 Lack of procedures for allowing response agencies to deliver emergency commodities to mobility limited residents.	Fire Department personnel delivered ice and MRE's to mobility limited residents. Initially, there was some difficulty getting the release of these commodities to allow for the fire department to distribute.	The process used for getting the commodities to these residents must be formalized and included in the EOP and SOPs	
Points of Distribution	 11.1 Reduce the need for PODS by restoring critical business operations 11.2 Poor coordination with Parish on location and opening of PODs. 	The need for PODs is reduced by focusing on restoring power to local businesses and infrastructure. Information was released to the public regarding a POD site before the site was fully supplied and operational. The release of information prior to the POD being ready to distribute goods caused long wait lines.	Ensure specified businesses are included in critical lists for priority power restoration Utilize JIC / JIS for all Public Information on Parish and Regional levels	
	11.3 Traffic Control at POD sites	PODs are designed as a drive through distribution. Co-locating a POD and distribution site for hot meals created a bottleneck.	Traffic control measures need to be reassessed to improve traffic flow.	

Activity	Issue	Analysis	Recommendation /Corrective Action	Primary Responsible Agency / POC
DSNAP Coordination and	12.1. Lack of	DSNAP locations were opened without	Re-evaluate plans and	
Operations	coordination between	communicating with parish OHSEP	procedures for post event	
	DCFS and parishes	offices. DCFS did not inform parishes of	DSNAP operations.	
	regarding location and	pre-registration or dissemination process		
	opening of DSNAP sites,	for the DSNAP sites.		
	pre-registration and			
	dissemination process.			
Disaster Recovery Centers	13.1 Parishes struggled to	Parishes were unable to meet the	Collect requirements from	
Coordination and	find a location that met	requirements set by GSA.	GSA to pre-identify sites	
Selection	the FEMA and GSA		for future DRCs.	
	requirements for a			
	Disaster Recovery Center			

Activity	Issue	Analysis	Recommendation /Corrective Action	Primary Responsible Agency / POC
Shelter Planning and Identification	1.1 Coordination between the shelters and American Red Cross.	Coordination was effective before the storm but when the shelters were trying to close down there was an overall lack of communication.	The National Shelter System (NSS) data base must be updated frequently in order to track the opening and closing of shelters. ARC should work with their chapters to update their procedures for communication and coordination with parishes during an emergency.	
	1.2 Evacuees were sent to the Parish without any notification.	State representatives in the EOC were reporting shelters as open which had been closed.	The National Shelter System (NSS) data base must be updated frequently in order to track the opening and closing of shelters.	
	1.3 Security at shelters	ARC shelters do not conduct background screening on evacuees prior to admitting individuals into their shelters.	Parish officials need to ensure security issues are addressed in their shelter plans and procedures.	
	1.4 Shelter operations are based on availability of space at the schools	In order to activate shelters, the school superintendent has to cancel school. This becomes in issue if shelters need to be open for an extended period.	Parishes should coordinate with ARC to identify suitable shelters to support their citizens other than school locations. If there is nothing available, parishes should begin to plan for a regional shelter solution.	
Public Information	2.1 Rumor control and major media was not releasing information from smaller parishes	Local channels were reporting inaccurate storm information Parishes were providing regular reports to media, but the media was only focusing on the larger population areas	Assign an ESF-15 POC to assist parish officials in developing and coordinating messaging that are outside of the major media markets.	

Region 2 Improvement Plan



Activity	Issue	Analysis	Recommendation /Corrective Action	Primary Responsible Agency / POC
Points of Distribution	3.1 Unrequested POD sites	POD locations were set up that were never requested by the parish.	Coordinate with Parish to ensure commodities are needed before deploying. The mission must be entered into Web EOC.	
DSNAP Coordination and Operations	4.1 (East Feliciana) Coordination during activation was poor	Initial coordination for when the site would open and what location would be used was lacking. Once the site was established operations went well.	Multiple locations in each parish should be designated for use as DSNAP sites. Parish officials would then be able to work with local law enforcement and fire authorities to develop site plans for each location.	

Activity	Issue	Analysis	Recommendation /Corrective Action	Primary Responsible Agency / POC
Evacuation Planning	1.1 Due to category of the storm, most citizens were complacent and sheltered in place. Citizens did not foresee the true impacts from storm surge.	Parishes need to focus on storm surge and SLOSH modeling, instead of relying solely on category for evacuation notifications.	Reevaluate plans to incorporate SLOSH modeling and storm surge for future events.	Parish OEP
	1.2 Some Parish Directors and other staff are new to Emergency Management	Personnel should have referred to the current Emergency Operations Plan during the storm for guidance.	Personnel should focus on rewriting EOP and training on all aspects of Emergency Management	GOHSEP Training
Shelter Planning and Identification	2.1 Current State shelter plans are based on a minimum of a Category 3 hurricane to open state shelters.	This storm changed course late, and based on the category, shelters were not, by plan, open to support evacuees. The cascading affects due to the storm caused the need to open shelters within the region.	Address planning to open shelters and advise evacuation or shelter in place based on SLOSH / storm surge and other factors, not solely on storm category.	
	2.3 Need to plan for evacuees that require a higher level of medical support than provided in general population shelters but do not meet the criteria to be admitted in the Medical Special Needs Shelter.	There is a portion of the population who require a level of medical support below what is characterized as medical special needs but exceeds the capabilities available at a general population shelter.	Many of those in this situation only need oxygen power stations or electricity. Additional plans should be developed to cover the medical needs of this population.	

Region 3 Improvement Plan

Activity	Issue	Analysis	Recommendation /Corrective Action	Primary Responsible Agency / POC
Emergency Response	3.1 Parishes within region	Parishes within the region have alternate	Standard Operating	Region 3 / GOHSEP
Commodities	have varying	methods of stocking their PODs. Some	Guidelines need to be	
	methodologies for PODs	parishes have a central hub where all	developed and followed for all POD sites in the state.	
		commodities are dropped and then distributed throughout the parish. Other	all POD sites in the state.	
		parishes have commodities dropped at		
		each site by the delivering vendor.		
Parish EOC activation,	5.1 St. John the Baptist	The opening of the EOC was delayed by 2	Revise Emergency	
manning, and declarations	EOC did not activate until	days while they evacuated and rescued	Operations Plans to	
	recovery mission was	approximately 4000 people from flooding	incorporate threat of storm	
	already started.	caused by the storm surge.	surge for future events.	
Conference Call Content	6.1 Conference calls are	Conference calls should be focused on	Prioritize conference calls	
and Duration	creating distraction from	areas most affected. Streamline all future	for jurisdictions in greatest	
	mission at hand.	calls for affected parishes to report first.	threat areas to allow for	
			most affected to return to	
			the mission at hand.	

Activity	Issue	Analysis	Recommendation /Corrective Action	Primary Responsible Agency / POC
Web EOC requests and issues	7.1 Parishes did not rely on Web EOC alone and feel they need to follow up with phone calls to GOHSEP leadership. There is an overall lack of confidence in the system.	Some parishes entered their requests in Web EOC, then made connections to specific POC's at the SEOC St Charles: LANG personnel pretty much handled Web EOC the whole time for them	Utilize Liaisons to provide feedback on status of requests; conduct Web EOC specific exercises	
	7.2 Web EOC Requests were prematurely closed out before entire mission requests were satisfied.	Web EOC requests for missions that included multiple tasks were closed out without completing the entire mission. SEOC Branch Managers are tasked with breaking down the request and assigning to appropriate ESFs.	Conduct Web EOC specific training and exercises with local and SEOC managers on the process to complete or close a request.	
	7.3 Web EOC users do not provide regular situational awareness of mission status.	The parishes would like to know the status of their requests, and/or be updated as to what progress is being made; would like to be able to track "broken out" tasks as they are processed	ESF Leads in the SEOC could provide this status; conduct Web EOC specific exercises	
Communications	8.1 St. John Lost T-1 lines for Trunking radio system	Due to lost power, lost radio communications tower ability for Trunking radio system. Need backup generators to maintain radio system	Include backup generators in the communications plan for emergencies.	
	9.1 Coordinate information to be released to the public with the parishes and region prior to release	FEMA released public information about IA/PA before providing the information to the parish OHSEP. This adversely affected the Parish operations and local public relations	Maximize the concept of a JIC / JIS for all public information	

Activity	Issue	Analysis	Recommendation /Corrective Action	Primary Responsible Agency / POC
Mass Care	10.1 Assumption Hospital was designated as a special needs shelter but was not utilized within the region	The special needs shelter was available, but was not opened. Terrebonne has no medical staff to support their shelters, only First Responders	Earlier planning, regional based Mass Care planning and response should be emphasized.	
	10.2 Shelter capacity was lowered prior to opening certain regional shelters.	During the response, a last minute assessment was conducted of regional shelters. This assessment resulted in the lowered capacity numbers that decreased the sheltering capability within the region.	Clarify standards of occupancy for various types of shelter and get final inspection, approval for such facilities	
Search and Rescue	11.1 SAR Operations overwhelmed regional capabilities due to late storm surge.	St. John the Baptist rapidly evacuated close to 6,000 people due to planning based solely on the Saffir-Simpson scale. Storm surge created flooding in areas that had historically not been affected by heavy rainfalls.	Revise EOP to reflect planning based on storm surge and SLOSH modeling. Hasty evacuations should utilize the SAR CONOPS, in place of standard evacuation procedures.	
	11.2 Due to a hasty evacuation of residents, tracking was rushed and inaccurate.	Because of the quick flooding, people were loaded on buses and evacuated rapidly. The staging and assembly points did not have time to adequately collect data on those who were rescued. Phones were down, so family members insisted on additional searches. Accountability or lack there or became a problem and created more work. Overall accountability issues between Wildlife and Fisheries having to rewrite missions, DOTD and variations of 1500 evacuees, caused repeat searches of areas.	Evaluate methods for rapid registering of evacuees, either on the buses, or once they arrive at a destination. Relay information to SEOC or other designated need. Work on bus manifests and how to transmit via alternate means. Consider HAM Radio which can now transmit data.	

Activity	Issue	Analysis	Recommendation /Corrective Action	Primary Responsible Agency / POC
Points of Distribution	12.1 The region mentioned multiple issues with PODs.	This region has varying plans and procedures for POD operations between Parishes. St James is split by the river. Some parishes want supplies delivered directly to their pre-designated sites. Others want supplies to one central point and will distribute from there on their own. Parishes use varying agencies to staff and support their PODS	Conduct a meeting with local and state ESF 7 leads to include Web EOC procedures for PODs to ensure each parish process is coordinated.	
DSNAP Coordination and Operations	13.1. Lack of coordination between DCFS and parishes regarding location and opening of DSNAP sites, pre-registration and dissemination process.	DSNAP locations were opened without communicating with parish OHSEP offices. DCFS did not inform parishes of pre-registration or dissemination process for the DSNAP sites.	Re-evaluate plans and procedures for post event DSNAP operations.	
Disaster Recovery Centers Coordination and Selection	14.1 Parishes struggled to find a location that met the FEMA and GSA requirements for a Disaster Recovery Center	Parishes were unable to meet the requirements set by GSA.	Collect requirements from GSA to pre-identify sites for future DRCs.	

		tegions i unu e improvement i		
Activity	Issue	Analysis	Recommendation /Corrective Action	Primary Responsible Agency / POC
Shelter Planning and Identification	1.1-Region is not prepared to shelter all citizens within the region.	(Iberia) there are no shelters rated for hurricane force winds.	Assess local capabilities and determine if a more suitable shelter exists in the parish. If not, determine what shelters in the Region are suitable for hurricane force winds.	
Emergency Response Commodities	2.1-Gas stations quickly depleted all fuel along hurricane evacuation routes.	Several parishes noted that local gas stations' fuel supplies were quickly depleted. This posed a concern for citizens who would need to evacuate as well as response efforts. DNR was contacted to provide a more sufficient refueling option.	Consider alternate local resources such as MOUs, with other parishes and private industry to assist in the quick resupply of important resources.	
Conference Call Content and Duration	3.1-Organization of Conference calls	Several parishes noted that there should be an established schedule for conference calls and it should be maintained with the consideration of time.	Develop procedures for ensuring that all conference calls are firmly structured and efficient.	
Web EOC requests and issues	4.1 –SEOC ESF leads were contacting parish OHSEP offices for information that was requested during the task force conference calls.	Parish OHSEP offices were reporting a large amount of data on daily conference calls. SEOC ESF leads were contacting the parish OHSEP offices to ask for the same information. GOHSEP needs to disseminate the data collected on all conference calls to ESF leads.	Disseminate data to ESF leads to allow parishes to focus on mission at hand.	
Public Information	5.1 Coordinate with parishes prior to releasing press releases.	Several press releases were issued prior to the information being disseminated to the parishes. This created confusion among the parish and locals.	Develop policies that ensure more clear communication channels so that all public information in press releases is also distributed to each parish.	
DSNAP Coordination and Operations	13.1. Lack of coordination between DCFS and parishes regarding location and	DSNAP locations were opened without communicating with parish OHSEP offices. DCFS did not inform parishes of pre-registration or dissemination process	Re-evaluate plans and procedures for post event DSNAP operations.	

Regions 4 and 5 Improvement Plan

opening of DS	NAP sites, for the DSNAP sites.	
pre-registration	and	
dissemination	process.	

Activity	Issue	Analysis	Recommendation /Corrective Action	Primary Responsible Agency / POC
IA/PA Preliminary Damage Assessment Teams	14.1 - Applicant briefings were not coordinated with the parishes.	Parishes were unaware of the process to set up applicant briefings and on a Regional level, the region did not find out about the briefing until the date had passed.	Develop plans and procedures to coordinate applicant briefings regionally and to ensure this information is communicated at the parish level.	

Activity	Issue	Analysis	Recommendation /Corrective Action	Primary Responsible Agency / POC
Shelter Planning and Identification	1.1 Shelters were not opened based on a sequence of fill.	Shelters were contacted to open, but were not needed or utilized. The State Sheltering Plan was not followed for any state shelters, nor was the sequence of fill used.	Conduct training and exercise on the shelter plans to ensure that all stakeholders are aware of the plan. Update State Sheltering Plan to reflect storm surge and SLOSH modeling.	
	1.2 Law Enforcement personnel were not properly utilized.	LSP was stationed at the Alexandria shelter and were needed at Jewella. The Jewella shelter had a larger evacuee population. Evacuee expectations should be addressed during the transport from evacuating area to the designated shelter.	Develop and distribute messaging for evacuees (either a video or brochure). Develop plans for the re- allocation of resources should it be required.	
	1.3 Point to point sheltering agreements does not include activation for any storms under a Category 3.	All point to point shelter plans only account for a Category 3 or higher. All MOUs need to be revised for storm surge and SLOSH modeling.	Rewrite Parish-to-Parish agreements to reflect storm surge and SLOSH modeling.	
	1.4 Critical Transportation Needs vehicle staging area and mass care shelter parking lots were co-located.	The vehicle staging area for Critical Transportation needs was the same location for the parking lot for the mass care shelter. This created a parking issue.	Additional planning to secure another location for vehicle staging for Critical Transportation needs.	
	1.5 Misunderstanding of what "open" and "on standby" for shelter activation levels created confusion among shelter workers.	When shelters were being contacted for use, there was confusion between being asked to standby and opening.	Clarify the terminology surrounding the various activation levels of shelters and update the State Sheltering plan. A single source (State EOC/Web EOC) should be used to request a shelter to open.	

Regions 6, 7 and 8 Improvement Plan

Activity	Issue	Analysis	Recommendation /Corrective Action	Primary Responsible Agency / POC
Shelter Planning and Identification, Continued	1.6 Shelters were not opened based on a sequence of fill; rather all sheltered were opened to open.	Shelters were opened all at once, instead of following the State Sheltering Plan to follow a sequence of fill, based on evacuated areas.	Revise and ensure State Sheltering Plan addresses a sequence of fill.	
Emergency Response Commodities	2.1 Local gas stations depleted the fuel supply along the hurricane evacuation route.	Several parishes noted that gas stations depleted their fuel supply very early in the event. This posed a concern for citizens who would need to evacuate as well as response efforts.	Consider alternate local resources such as MOUs, with other parishes and contracts with private industry to assist in the quick resupply of important resources.	
Other	3.1 Donations were brought to shelters and there were no personnel to sort and store the received goods.	There was no place to store goods provided by VOAD. Additionally, there was no donations control as citizens were bringing donations directly to the shelter.	Assess regional capabilities and determine where and how volunteer donations should be stored and managed. Incorporate donation management into the EOP.	
Parish EOC activation, manning, and declarations	4.1 State agencies sent liaisons to parish OHSEP EOCs who were not requested.	Unidentified agencies who were not involved in the pre-planning showed up to the EOC in Rapides but did not provide any support. Additionally, there was not DCFS representative in the EOC.	Ensure that each agency POC is part of the EOC activation plan and that there is a manifest of all individuals who should be in the EOC and ensure those who are not on the manifest are not allowed in.	

Activity	Issue	Analysis	Recommendation /Corrective Action	Primary Responsible Agency / POC
Web EOC requests and	5.1 Web EOC Requests	Web EOC requests for missions that	Conduct Web EOC specific	
issues	were prematurely closed	included multiple tasks were closed out	training and exercises with	
	out before entire mission	without completing the entire mission.	local and SEOC managers	
	requests were satisfied.	SEOC Branch Managers are tasked with	on the process to complete	
		breaking down the request and assigning	or close a request.	
		to appropriate ESFs.		
Public Information	6.1 Management of social	Several parishes noted that there was	PIO training	
	media resources.	miscommunication and false information		
		that was being distributed on social media		
		outlets. Parishes should coordinate their		
		messages with the State before sending out public information messages via social		
		media.		
Mass Care	7.1 Ability to support	FEMA medic units showed up at BC	Assess the capabilities of	
Wass Care	FEMA Medic units	shelter needing support (facilities, washer	each shelter in the region	
	I LIVITY Weater units	and dryer). There was no clarification as to	and clarify these and what	
		what "self-supporting" means with regards	resources they have at their	
		to the shelter. The shelter was expected to	disposal.	
		accommodate medics who needed to sleep.	1	
Other	8. Re-entry plan was not	The re-entry plan was not followed due to	Additional trainings and	
	followed.	various issues that arose. The buses were	exercises on the re-entry	
		launched back home before the receiving	plan.	
		parish and shelter was prepared and ready		
		to accept the citizens.		

Activity	Issue	Analysis	Recommendation /Corrective Action	Primary Responsible Agency / POC
DSNAP Coordination and Operations	14.1. Lack of coordination between DCFS and parishes regarding location and opening of DSNAP sites, pre-registration and dissemination process.	DSNAP locations were opened without communicating with parish OHSEP offices. DCFS did not inform parishes of pre-registration or dissemination process for the DSNAP sites.	Re-evaluate plans and procedures for post event DSNAP operations.	

Region 9 Improvement Plan

Activity	Issue	Analysis	Recommendation /Corrective Action	Primary Responsible Agency / POC
Shelter Planning and Identification	1.1 Lack of communication between DHH and parish officials regarding the opening of special needs shelter	DHH does not regularly open special needs shelters for tropical storms because there might be a more effective way to provide care to the citizens. Parish officials were not notified and their special needs population was sent to Baton Rouge and Alexandria to be sheltered.	Plans and policies need to be developed and provided to state and parish officials that detail the decision points regarding opening SNS shelters. These plans must to be revised and based on SLOSH models rather than storm severity.	
Public Information	2.1 Boil advisory information was not relayed to parish officials	Lack of communication with DHH/OPH regarding boil order.	Parish officials should be provided with pertinent information regarding all public health issues prior to that information being released to the public.	
Mass Care	3.1 - Need to plan for evacuees that require a higher level of medical support than provided in general population shelters but do not meet the criteria to be admitted in the Medical Special Needs Shelter.	There is a portion of the population who require a level of medical support below what is characterized as medical special needs but exceeds the capabilities available at a general population shelter.	Many of those in this situation only need oxygen power stations or electricity. Additional plans should be developed to cover the medical needs of this population.	

Activity	Issue	Analysis	Recommendation /Corrective Action	Primary Responsible Agency / POC
Points of Distribution	4.1 - Policy decision required all POD sites to be opened automatically	Decisions were made for all POD sites be activated in parishes, even though there was no need to open all sites.	Redesign the parish EOP to allow for more flexibility when making the decision of how many and which PODs to open	
DSNAP Coordination and Operations	5.1 Lack of coordination with opening DSNAP site	DCFS did not coordinate with Parish officials who were given less than 12 hours of notice of the location and opening time for a DSNAP	Multiple locations in each parish should be designated for use as DSNAP sites. Parish officials would then be able to work with local law enforcement and fire authorities to develop site plans for each location. This would allow for a quicker response time when opening a site.	
Disaster Recovery Centers Coordination and Selection	6.1 GSA and FEMA did not coordinate effectively with local officials	GSA and FEMA requirements were not provided to local business officials who were offering space for the DRCs.	Work with FEMA and GSA on specifications and pre-designate locations for DRC sites.	

Activity	Issue	Analysis	Recommendation /Corrective Action	Capability Element:	Primary Responsible Agency
Evacuation Planning	1.1 Due to the category of the storm and the perceived threat, citizens sheltered in place instead of evacuating; increase response demands after storm	Must enhance sheltering- in-place capabilities for minimal threat storms, all hazards, and no notice events. Develop plans and capabilities for search and rescue and mass care within the parish with potential support from the state.	Focus more on locally based public education related to storm surge vs. storm category. Provide timely projected impact data to the parish so informed decisions can be made. Utilize Point to Point sheltering agreements Develop better plans to include sheltering in place if appropriate for the event and SAR.	Planning	Parish OEP GOHSEP Preparedness
	1.2 Evacuation buses need radios and better direct communications with drivers.	Jefferson Parish reported that the process for requesting the buses from the state went well, but they need to be able to contact the drivers while they are in route. Currently they have to contact LSP to reach the escort trooper to get an ETA for their arrival.	Buses need radios or some type of direct communication with the drivers	Equipment Planning	DOTD
	1.3 New Parish Directors and other staff are new to Emergency Management	New personnel were in process of training for EOC operations. Need more training and exercises.	Develop fast track training program and guidance for new officials. Utilize LA HEEP program to provide Training and education. Utilize GOHSEP LNO teams to support impacted parishes with new directors / leadership.	Training	Parish OEP GOHSEP Preparedness

Appendix 2: State Combined Improvement Plan

Activity	Issue	Analysis	Recommendation /Corrective Action	Capability Element:	Primary Responsible Agency
Evacuation Planning	1.4 State superseded parishes in evacuation efforts	The State recommended evacuation of local areas and the Department of Education went directly to local school board for school buses without talking to Parish President or OEP Director.	All requests for parish assets should be coordinated with and through the parish emergency management office. The State should provide accurate situational awareness to local officials and recommendations as required.	Planning Training	DOTD
Shelter Planning and Identification	2.1 Many shelters, to include point to point and MSNS, are planned to be opened based on a storm category of 3 or greater.	Hurricane Isaac changed course late, and based on the category, shelters were not, by plan, directed to open to support evacuees. The impact assessment changed and it was determined shelters needed to open. Point to Point shelter agreements do not reflect all categories of storms, only Cat 3 or above.	Address planning to open shelters and advise evacuation based on SLOSH / storm surge and projected impacts, not just storm category Amend Point to Point agreements based on need and not limited to hurricane category.	Planning	DCFS DHH
	2.2 Criteria of evacuees for general population vs medical special needs	Part of the population that needed sheltering did not meet the requirements for special needs shelters but exceeded the needs of general population shelters	Provide shelters with oxygen power stations or simple oxygen hook-ups. Many of these are self-sufficient, just need Oxygen	Planning	DCFS



Activity	Issue	Analysis	Recommendation /Corrective Action	Capability Element:	Primary Responsible Agency
Shelter Planning and Identification	2.3 Coordination between the shelters and American Red Cross.	Coordination and communication was effective before the storm but broke down during the event and when the shelters were trying to close. ARC representatives in the EOC were reporting shelters as open, which had been closed.	NSS Shelter list needs to be updated and maintained on a more frequent schedule in order to more accurately track the opening and closing of shelters.	Planning	DCFS ARC
	2.4 Inadequate parish sheltering capabilities or sites based on availability of space at schools	Some parishes (Iberia) have no shelters rated for hurricane force winds while others only have facility agreements with their schools. In order to activate shelters, the school superintendent has to cancel school. This becomes an issue if shelters need to be open for an extended period	Assess local capabilities and determine if more suitable shelters exists in the parish. If not, determine what shelters in the Region can sustain hurricane force winds.	Planning	Parish DCFS ARC
	2.5 Lack of coordination with parish officials who host state managed shelters	The parishes that hosted the state managed shelters were not given enough information on the opening of these shelters. The shelter plans were not followed which caused confusion.	Update plans to ensure that all parishes with shelters are notified when they might be utilized. Must have a Web EOC request to open all state managed shelters. Conduct training and exercise on the shelter plans to ensure that all stakeholders are aware of the plan. Develop and follow a shelter sequence of fill based on several	Planning Training	DCFS

Activity	Issue	Analysis	Recommendation /Corrective Action	Capability Element:	Primary Responsible Agency
Shelter Planning and Identification	2.6 State managed Critical Transportation Needs Shelters accepted drive ups.	Plans were not followed and citizens with their own vehicles were allowed in the state shelters which created parking issues and operational issues. The Alexandria State Shelter does not have adequate parking to accommodate the additional vehicles. Plans had to be adjusted at all of the shelters to accommodate the additional vehicles.	Must adjust current planning assumptions to allow for the possibility for personal vehicles at state managed shelter sites. Identify adequate alternative parking for citizens at each site.	Planning	DCFS Parish
	2.7 Sheltering terminology	There was not a common language regarding shelters. There was confusion whether "open" meant a shelter was fully staffed, or if it was on standby. It was difficult to allocate resources based on confusion as to what qualifies a shelter as open, on standby, or ready to receive.	Clarify the terminology surrounding the various activation levels of shelters and ensure this clarification is contained within the sheltering plan.	Planning Training	DCFS
	2.8 Shelter Capacity based on the actual need	More shelters were opened and put on standby than were necessary causing a overspending of funds and overextension of resources.	Adapt plans to allow shelters to be opened as needed rather than stipulating that all shelters open simultaneously. Develop and follow a shelter sequence of fill based on several scenarios.	Planning	DCFS



Activity	Issue	Analysis	Recommendation /Corrective Action	Capability Element:	Primary Responsible Agency
Shelter Planning and Identification	2.9 Security planning for shelters.	Planned security forces were not stood up at the Jewella shelter while there were wasted resources placed at the Westpark facility. The Alexandria state shelter had more security officers than the Jewella shelter despite having a smaller population.	Develop scalable and flexible plans for the re-allocation of security resources should it be required.	Planning Training Exercise	DCFS LSP
	2.10 Management of evacuee expectations	There was overall a lack of expectations of CTN evacuees once they arrived at the shelters.	State should have pre-scripted messages to be shown or read on the bus while in route to the CTN shelters.	Planning Training Exercise	DOTD DCFS GOHSEP
	2.11 Law enforcement planning for shelters – State vs. Local Assets	There seems to be competing expectations for shelter security. LSP would like local LE to provide more. Local LE would like LSP to provide more resources. In either case, there is a greater need for more resources, earlier and ongoing when providing LE for shelters and other missions including DRC, DSNAP, etc. and to maintain continuity of regular LE.	Clarify expectations in planning and reach out earlier for more LE resources with continued sustainability. Consider auxiliary support for LE presence.	Planning	LSP
Web EOC requests and issues	3.1 Some parishes did not rely on Web EOC alone; feel they need to follow up. Lack confidence in the system	Some parishes entered their requests in Web EOC, then made contact to specific POC's at the SEOC	Utilize liaisons to provide feedback on status of requests; conduct Web EOC specific exercises and training to emphasize the importance of updating missions. Must close the loop on each mission.	Training Exercise between Region and SEOC	GOHSEP OPS

Activity	Issue	Analysis	Recommendation /Corrective Action	Capability Element:	Primary Responsible Agency
Web EOC requests and issues	3.2 Web EOC Requests were prematurely closed out before entire mission requests were satisfied	Web EOC requests for missions including multiple types of assets were closed out once one of the many resources were assigned, leaving voids in other resource deployments; SEOC Branch Managers are tasked with breaking down the submissions and assigning to proper ESF's	Local liaisons; conduct Web EOC specific exercises and better training of EOC Branch Managers and state agency ESF staff. Emphasized the importance of updating missions. Must close the loop on each mission.	Exercise	GOHSEP OPS
	3.3 Web EOC does not provide adequate visibility / situational awareness of request process	The parishes would like to know the status of their requests, and/or be updated as to what progress is being made; would like to be able to track "broken out" tasks as they are processed.	Local liaisons; conduct Web EOC specific exercises and better training of EOC Branch Managers and state agency ESF staff. Emphasized the importance of updating missions. Must close the loop on each mission.	Exercise	GOHSEP OPS
	3.4 PODS; while they are pre-scripted missions, status tracking was an issue	Parishes would like to know the status of the PODS in between being deployed and arriving on determined site	Local liaisons in the SEOC could provide this status; conduct Web EOC specific exercises	Exercise	GOHSEP OPS & LOGISTICS
Communications	4.1 Plaquemines requested Communications Trailer	Delay in getting communications trailer; trailer not fully ready	Ensure deployed resource matches request	Equipment	DPS LANG
	4.2 AT&T pedestals batteries ran out; no back-up generators or generators not working	AT&T pedestals battery / generator failure caused 911 lines to fail. AT&T would not send repair crews citing hazardous conditions	Develop task forces with needed assets to support / protect AT&T repair crews	Planning	DPS LANG LA BEOC



Activity	Issue	Analysis	Recommendation /Corrective Action	Capability Element:	Primary Responsible Agency
Communications	4. 3 Talk groups assigned for storm response were also set for LSU game operations	Plaquemines Parish stated their state assigned talk groups were being shared / used by assets at the LSU Football game	Review channel assignments; update plans	Planning	DPS LANG
	4.4 State communication towers lost internet connectivity to the master site.	3 of the 7 state communication towers in Region 3 were inoperable. All radios were locked on that one site or were scanning for the next available tower. Users could only talk to radios affiliated with that alternate tower.	Install microwave back haul and eliminate the internet capabilities on all the towers below I-10/I-12.	Planning Equipment	DPS LANG
Public Information	5.1 Social Media worked well but double edged sword	Social media seemed to be a successful, however once utilized it sets a precedent, expectations for future. Requires full time dedicated position during activation of EOC Op's	Designate in the EOP a designated position added to the JIC/PIO to address social media demands; incorporate the use of this asset in exercises and trainings.	Planning Equipment	Parish OEP GOHSEP PIO
	5.2 Share public information originating from state or federal agencies with Parishes / Regions prior to release	FEMA released public information about IA/PA prior to the Parishes knowing about it. This adversely affected the Parish operations and local public relations. Parishes were not aware of the information that was going out in press releases from the state.	Maximize the capabilities of the a JIC / JIS for all public information	Planning Training Exercise	GOHSEP PIO

Activity	Issue	Analysis	Recommendation /Corrective Action	Capability Element:	Primary Responsible Agency
Public Information	5.3 Rumor control (Iberville)	Local channels were reporting inaccurate storm information	Assign an ESF-15 POC to assist parish officials in developing and coordinating messaging.	Planning	GOHSEP PIO
	5.4 Major media is not releasing information from smaller parishes	Parishes are providing regular reports to media, but the media is only focusing on the larger population areas	Assign an ESF-15 POC to assist parish officials in developing and coordinating messaging. Use alternate messaging for smaller out of market parishes.	Planning	GOHSEP PIO
	5.5 Boil advisory information was not relayed to parish officials	Lack of communication with DHH/OPH regarding boil order.	Parish officials should be provided with any information effecting their population prior to releasing it to the public	Planning	DHH PIO
Mass Care	6.1 Resources and assets available to the state are becoming scarce and harder to secure. In some instances the state is competing with locals for the same assets such as security and medical assets.	There seems to be an issue of competing for resources, especially in medical personnel and security personnel. In these cases, the parish should make every effort to recruit and incorporate these stakeholders in their planning efforts. Local organic assets in the area should be utilized by the parish to the maximum extent possible.	Work with each parish to identify local resources. Consider non-traditional means to acquire additional assets such as EMAC.	Planning Training Exercise	Parish OEP GOHSEP DCFS DHH LSP



Activity	Issue	Analysis	Recommendation /Corrective Action	Capability Element:	Primary Responsible Agency
Mass Care	6.2 Phoenix System, tracking evacuees by Driver's License - Evacuee's physical residence is different from their ID or driver's license.	By only utilizing the data scanned from the driver's license/ ID, it was difficult to track how many citizens from each parish were being sheltered. This caused issues when planning for reentry operations and assessing the need for in parish shelters.	When registering evacuees, need to confirm current address and be able to update; Update Planning/ procedures, Train and Exercise	Training Exercise	DCFS
	6.3 Assisted Living facilities requirements for backup generators	Need to improve the capabilities of nursing homes / assisted living facilities for backup generators. Currently few mandates. This put significant strain on Parish assets / first responders / shelters when these facilities need to be evacuated.	Major planning and organization efforts are needed between DHH, sheltering operations agencies, and parish officials to account for their needs until provisions can be put in place that require the assisted living facilities to be self-sufficient. Review and validate each facility has a viable evacuation plan	Planning Exercise Training	DHH
	6.4 Mental Health support	DHH noted the need to reach out to the medical community to increase support for mental health assets in shelters / evacuation of residents with mental health needs.	Consider non-traditional means to acquire additional assets such as EMAC or FEMA Consider CERT / Medical Reserve Corp	Planning	Parish OEP DHH
	6.5 Shelter use & occupancy became an issue with the Fire Marshal	There seemed to be some last minute changes to the designated shelters' occupancy loads as approved by the Fire Marshal. Cited was a reduction of a planned shelter for 400 that was reduced to 180. There seems to be some confusion and conflict between the designated shelters and Fire Marshal regulations	Clarify standards of occupancy for various types of shelter and get final inspection, approval for such facilities. Work with the parish and State Fire Marshall's Office to certify occupancy numbers.	Planning	DCFS ARC State Fire Marshall

Activity	Issue	Analysis	Recommendation /Corrective Action	Capability Element:	Primary Responsible Agency
Mass Care	6.7 Increase in population with chronic medical conditions	The number of people who are not in medical facilities but who still suffer from chronic medical conditions is rising. This increased population is putting more strain on the mass care plans at the local and state levels	Special needs planning must include a clear understanding of the level of care at and the capabilities of each shelter location so that the public is fully aware of what they can plan for at one of these shelters. Special Needs shelter plans and staff must be prepared to care for people that are just as sick as those in hospitals. Does DHH have the medical professionals and resources to handle the increased numbers? Consider non- traditional means to acquire additional assets such as EMAC or FEMA	Planning Process Exercise	DCFS ARC DHH
Points of Distribution	7.1 Reduce need for PODS by restoring businesses	Support restoration of power to get businesses back operating.	Ensure specified businesses are included in critical lists for priority power restoration	Planning	Parish OEP LANG LA BEOC
	7.2 Information control	Based on public information, PODS were under supplied and led to false expectations of ice, water initially. Once caught up, the process worked well.	Utilize JIC / JIS for all public information on parish and regional levels. LANG coordination with requesting parish is a must for timely and accurate information	Planning Training Exercise	LANG
	7.3 Traffic Control at POD sites	Parking was a problem where drivers got out of their cars and walked to the sites, causing further delays in traffic. Sites are meant to be drive through / by, not park and walk.	Reassess site layout and traffic control, and utilize public information assets to explain how the POD will operate. Use Local law enforcement to assist in traffic flow and security	Planning Training Exercise	LANG



Activity	Issue	Analysis	Recommendation /Corrective Action	Capability Element:	Primary Responsible Agency
Points of Distribution	7.4 Unrequested PODs	PODs were set up in sites that were not requested by the Parish.	Parish officials should be notified of all operations planned for their jurisdiction. Parish must request opening/closing of full PODS/ selected commodities through Web EOC.	Planning Training Exercise	LANG
	7.5 State is not familiar with the separate methodologies for POD operations in region 3;	This region has varying plans and procedures for POD operations between Parishes. Some parishes want supplies delivered directly to their pre-designated sites. Others want supplies to one central point and will distribute from there on their own. Parishes use varying agencies to staff and support their PODS	Conduct a coordination meeting to formalize detailed POD planning with each parish.	Planning Training Exercise	LANG
	7.6 Policy decision required all POD sites to be opened automatically (Tangipahoa)	Decision was made that all 7 POD sites be activated, even though there was no need to open all sites	Conduct a coordination meeting to formalize detailed POD planning with each parish.	Planning	LANG
DSNAP Coordination and Operations	8.1. Numerous issues and comments; greatest issue is demand vs. supply; facilities; public awareness and education	 This overall process has many commonalities throughout parishes and almost all Regions. Major issues for improvement include: Local and state coordination from pre-event planning through final demobilization. Public information sent out then changed in midst of process. No advance information given to parishes. poor communications and coordination 	Continue analysis of AAC's, finalize AAR, then assess and prioritize steps for improvement. Involve local and state representatives in this process. DCFS must conduct detailed planning with each parish on potential DNSP operations and all state support agencies.	Planning Training Exercise	DCFS

Activity	Issue	Analysis	Recommendation /Corrective Action	Capability Element:	Primary Responsible Agency
DSNAP Coordination and Operations	8.2 Public information regarding DSNAP locations.	Inaccurate public information and when information was requested from the State regarding clarification, it was not obtained. (St. Mary)	Develop processes to ensure that public information regarding specific parishes is accurate before it is released. Detailed planning and coordination with each parish is required.	Planning Training	DCFS
	8.3-Issues with DCFS line and 211 miscommunication.	DCFS had issues with their contractor who was answering the phones. 211 ended up answering 1/3 of the calls regarding DSNAP. DCFS did not provide any information to 211 regarding location and capabilities.	DCFS should ensure that all emergency communications outlets (211, etc.) have the correct information to distribute to the public in the event that their communications capabilities are diminished.	Planning	DCFS
	8.4 Lack of coordination with opening DSNAP sites	Parish officials were given less than 12 hours of notice of the location and opening time for DSNAP operations.	Multiple locations in each parish should be designated for use as DSNAP sites. Parish officials would then be able to work with local law enforcement and fire authorities to develop site plans for each location. This would allow for a quicker response time when opening a site.	Planning	DCFS
Disaster Recovery Centers Coordination and Selection	9.1 Numerous issues and comments; public awareness and education. GSA and FEMA did not coordinate effectively with local officials	Major issue of pre-designated sites and getting FEMA to lease / use approve facilities. Put strain on local business and government relations. GSA and FEMA would not work with local business officials who were offering space for the DRCs causing significant delays in the process.	Work with parishes to identify potential DRC sites to improve the GSA contracting process. Work with FEMA to determine and prepare for other logistical requirements to expedite the opening process.	Planning	GOHSEP Recovery