



2025 Mass Casualty Incident

After-Action Report/Improvement Plan

January 2025



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ADMINISTRATIVE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The information contained in this summary was compiled from various reports generated by federal and state agencies. The Mass Casualty Terrorist Attack occurred on January 1, 2025 at 3:17 AM Central Standard Time, in Orleans Parish. This tragic incident occurred in the New Orleans' French Quarter when an individual, Shamsud-Din Jabbar, drove a pickup truck around a marked New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) unit onto Bourbon Street and sped several blocks down the street hitting multiple individuals until colliding into a stationary construction vehicle. Jabbar then exchanged gunfire with officers of the NOPD, where he was neutralized. Two NOPD officers were wounded by gun fire with non-life-threatening injuries. NOPD and Probation and Parole (P&P) Special Response Team (SRT) were presented and involved in Jabbar being removed from the vehicle after he was neutralized. Once the suspect was neutralized, triage and care of multiple victims along Bourbon Street began. Governor Landry declared a state of emergency on January 1, 11:42 AM.

The incident resulted in 15 fatalities and 49 individuals physically injured. Of the 15, 11 were deceased at the Bourbon Street site, 1 was the perpetrator, and 3 succumbed to their injuries in the hospital setting. The Louisiana Department of Health (LDH) reported that University Medical Center (UMC) took a majority of the casualties, with the remaining going to 5 nearby hospitals. The City of New Orleans and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) set up multiple Victim Identification Units (VIU). These services were put in place to help with crisis counseling and notification to families.

On New Year's Eve, a significant event in New Orleans, the city implemented an enhanced public safety presence, particularly in the French Quarter. This response was bolstered by local, state, and federal agencies, including the NOPD, New Orleans Fire Department (NOFD), New Orleans Emergency Medical Services (NOEMS), LSP, Department of Public Safety (DPS), Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF), FBI, and the Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), among others. Following the initial response, the Governor directed the Louisiana National Guard (LANG) to deploy one military police (MP) company. Once the situation was stabilized and deemed to have a terroristic nature, the FBI took command of the investigation.

The FBI is treating this incident as an act of terrorism inspired by Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Investigators stated that there was no known nexus to the explosion involving a Tesla Cybertruck outside the Trump Hotel in Las Vegas on the same day. The Governor of Louisiana, Jeff Landry, condemned the incident as "heinous" and has assured resident that the State of Louisiana will provide every resource to assist in the investigation and support to the victims.

Jabbar became more devout to the Muslim religion in 2022. As this occurred, Jabbar began to isolate himself from society and follow extremist views. The FBI's Initial review of Jabbar's electronics showed that he had completed several online searches in reference to balconies on Bourbon Street, Mardi Gras, and shootings in the city that occurred as late as mid-November. Hours before the incident on Bourbon Street, Jabbar researched information in reference to the car that drove through a Christmas market in Germany ramming into innocent victims. The FBI continues to investigate this tragic incident. Information, pictures, or videos related to the incident can be submitted to www.fbi.gov/bourbonstreetattack or via phone at 1-800-CALL-FBI.

A Presidential declaration was requested on January 2, 2025, by Governor Landry. A Small Business Administration (SBA) Economic Injury Disaster Loan was approved on January 3, 2025. This will make SBA Loans available to the impacted businesses in the affected parishes: Orleans, Jefferson, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, and St. Tammany Parishes. This loan will end October 3, 2025. SBA applications can be submitted for the Economic Injury Disaster Loan via <https://lending.sba.gov>.

The objectives for this incident were as follows:

- To ensure public safety
- Neutralize the threat
- Coordinate resources and personnel
- Ensure effective communication
- Manage and evacuate the area
- Support victims and families
- Secure critical infrastructure
- Gather intelligence and investigate
- Ensure and support long-term recovery
- Review and strengthen security measures

PURPOSE

The purpose of the 2025 Mass Casualty Incident AAR/IP is to capture which elements of emergency operations plans and procedures worked well and the elements that need to be improved upon for future mass casualty response and recovery efforts. The improvement table provides a comprehensive list of those elements for improvement and assigns entities responsible for completing the plan changes.

SCOPE

The scope of this AAR/IP is to capture response and coordination efforts between local, state, federal and nongovernmental partnerships. Parishes and state agency partners conduct their own internal AARs to capture elements specific to their response efforts. The surveys specifically highlighted the following functional areas for reflection and evaluation:

- Emergency Operation Center (EOC) Activation and Coordination
- Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)
- Situational Reports (SITREPs)
- Information and data sharing
- Public Information Office/Joint Information Center (JICC)
- WebEOC
- Communication- systems and equipment
- Security and Interoperability (S & I)
- Cybersecurity
- Regional Support
- Emergency Support Functions (ESFs)
- Operational Rhythm

AAR STRUCTURE

The AAR meetings were held with two different focus groups. This gave the GOHSEP internal staff and ESF personnel the opportunity to meet separately to ensure all parties had the ability to express their opinions and/or concerns openly. Two note takers were assigned to the AARs to ensure consistency and the ability to capture all observations, identify improvements, and sustainment of actions.

PARTICIPANTS

Participants had the ability to meet in-person at the State Emergency Operation Center (SEOC) on Independence Blvd. or virtually via Microsoft Teams. There were 104 attendees between the two after action meetings.

UMR & GOHSEP Internal Staff	55
Emergency Support Function Personnel	49
Total	104

PRIMARY AREAS OF SUSTAINMENT

Over the past year, GOHSEP has focused on enhancing both internal operations and collaboration with our Emergency Support Function (ESF) partners. The primary goal is to improve efficiency throughout the emergency management cycle, enabling quicker responses to save lives, protect property, and maintain infrastructure. In preparation for Super Bowl LIX, multiple training events and exercises were conducted, including “No-Notice” scenarios designed to test the staff’s ability to communicate and respond to imminent threats when standard work centers were unavailable. These efforts proved invaluable during the January 1 attacks on Bourbon Street in New Orleans.

Despite the attack occurring early in the morning on a state holiday, GOHSEP was able to rapidly mobilize and respond. Within just 15 minutes of staff notification, a Crisis Action Team (CAT) was established to provide command and control. Active communication began immediately between senior GOHSEP staff, key state secretaries, and ESF leads, ensuring all parties were informed and coordinated. Real-time intelligence and situational awareness were developed and distributed to response partners. The first Situation Report (SITREP) was issued at 5:40 AM, and updates were provided hourly as more information became available. As the situation stabilized, the reporting cycle shifted to a more regular rhythm.

As the event appeared to be expanding, GOHSEP made the decision to increase staffing and raise the activation level of the Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The EOC was elevated to Level 3 at 3:00 PM, with select ESFs reporting in and being fully staffed. Prior to full staffing, a coordination call was held via Microsoft Teams, involving all ESFs and Parish Directors, which facilitated communication and ensured all responders were integrated. Throughout the mobilization, rapid coordination occurred between state, local, and federal partners. Resource requests were processed through WebEOC or communicated verbally, and law enforcement agencies, including State Police, State Fire Marshal, Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, and

Department of Corrections, began deploying to the scene. Within six hours, the National Guard, under the Governor's direction, deployed a Military Police Company and command staff.

The response to this crisis was further supported by the effective command and control established early in the response. GOHSEP's ability to stand up the Crisis Action Team quickly and scale EOC operations as the incident unfolded demonstrated the readiness of the organization. The success of this response was also due to lessons learned from previous exercises including a "No-Notice" exercise held on January 31, 2024, which had tested communication and coordination among key GOHSEP leadership. Information shared with other states helped inform best practices and ensured that the response was as comprehensive as possible.

GOHSEP also emphasized clear and timely communication throughout the event, including direct information from the Governor that was shared with key stakeholders at the Louisiana Department of Health (LDH). GOHSEP has worked to maintain and strengthen relationships across local, state, and federal emergency management partners. This collaborative effort proved essential in managing the complexity of the response. The partnerships developed in "blue skies" — when there are no immediate threats — provided a strong foundation for effective action during "gray skies," when emergencies require swift and coordinated efforts. These relationships, built on mutual trust and understanding of each ESF's unique capabilities, allowed for a rapid, unified response.

As the incident stabilized, SITREPs became more focused and tailored, reflecting the evolving nature of the event. Resources requested by response partners were efficiently dispatched to the appropriate locations, and the logistics team ensured that these resources arrived in a timely manner. Additionally, GOHSEP's administrative teams, including cyber and dark web monitoring units, implemented systems for tracking and reporting critical information, further bolstering the effectiveness of the overall response.

The positive response to the January 1 attacks showcased the preparedness, agility, and collaboration of GOHSEP and its partners. The ability to quickly mobilize resources, establish clear command and control, and maintain continuous communication throughout the event were key to ensuring a successful response. Due to this coordinated effort and the proactive measures implemented, it provided the opportunity for the city and state to host a College Football Playoff game, one day after a terrorist attack.

Appendix A: Improvement Plan

Observation Title	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Priority	Primary Responsible Organization	Responsible Individual	Type of Improvement	Completed - Yes, No, Ongoing
Response Coordination	Due to the holiday timeframe not all employees brought equipment (laptops, iPads, and radios) home and were not prepared for a no notice event.	Refine no notice event SOP. Ensure Unit Manned Roster (UMR) staff receive updated SOP.	Medium	GOHSEP	Operations	Operational Procedures	YES
Operational	Due to no notice event, and gradual activation of EOC. Staffing patterns were disjointed at first leading to staff working longer than necessary.	The number of staff was kept small at first due to waiting on ascertaining safe locations. Will size appropriately at beginning of event and downsize later if necessary.	Medium	GOHSEP	Operations	Operational Procedures	YES
Operational	No prescript mission for no notice event for ESF-13 and ESF-16.	Develop prescript mission response packages based on security and terrorist events.	Medium	LANG, LSP	Joint Directorate of Military School (JDOMS)	Coordination	YES
Notification	Some of the ESFs responding were not in the system to receive activation text message. Some only received the phone message and email.	Monthly Ready Op verification to UMR/ESF leads.	High	GOHSEP	Operations	Operational Procedures	YES

Observation Title	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Priority	Primary Responsible Organization	Responsible Individual	Type of Improvement	Completed - Yes, No, Ongoing
Notification	ReadyOp call appears as staff member calling and should appear as “ReadyOp Alert”.	Assign different number to ReadyOp	Medium	GOHSEP	Operations	Technology Utilization	YES
Notification	There is not a SOP for sending EOC activation notifications.	Review GCIR list. Set SOP with timelines for notifications to Director then to Incident Distro List/ReadyOp/RAVE	High	GOHSEP	Operations/ Security & Interoperability	Operational Procedures	YES
Notification	Did not utilize the additional notification system, RAVE APP when notifying GOHSEP.	Review GCIR list. Set SOP with timelines for notifications to Director then to Incident Distro List/ReadyOp/RAVE	High	GOHSEP	Operations	Communication	YES
Reporting	ESF SITREPs were not submitted by the required deadline.	Display and distribution of operational rhythm. Automated notification development for reminders in WebEOC.	Medium	GOHSEP	Operations	Operational Procedures	YES
Notification	Red Cross had difficulty getting emails from GOHSEP.	Red Cross communicated with GOHSEP and corrected issue	Medium	GOHSEP	Operations	Technology Utilization	YES

Observation Title	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Priority	Primary Responsible Organization	Responsible Individual	Type of Improvement	Completed - Yes, No, Ongoing
Reporting	Lack of standardized SPOTREP, 5 W's (who, what, when, where, why) needed.	Develop and publish SPOTREP SOP. Use of ReadyOp or WEBEOC Significant Events Board. Generate into a PDF version.	High	GOHSEP	Operations	Operational Procedures	YES
Reporting	SITREPs from GOHSEP ESFs were not being consistently entered into WebEOC in accordance with the Operational Rhythm.	Training of staff and ESF partners on WebEOC.	High	GOHSEP, ESFs	Operations	Operational Procedures	YES
Reporting	WebEOC was not utilized consistently as the centralized location for resource request and information sharing.	Training will be disseminated to ESFs and training conducted if necessary.	High	ESFs	Operations	Operational Procedures	Ongoing
Information Sharing	Communications between S & I and EM was challenging due to the fast pace of information flow.	Implementation of standardized SPOTREP.	High	GOHSEP	Operations/ Security & Interoperability	Communication	YES
Reporting	Situational information reported and then never followed back up on or not in a timely manner.	Coordination with S & I to develop a means for informational flow.	Medium	GOHSEP/ LSP	Operations/ Planning	Communication	YES
Operational	Intel brief was not held prior to the initial briefing.	Provide Intelligence Summary (INSUM) to all coordination and shift change briefs.	Medium	GOHSEP	Security and Interoperability	Operational Procedures	YES


Observation Title	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Priority	Primary Responsible Organization	Responsible Individual	Type of Improvement	Completed - Yes, No, Ongoing
Information Sharing	Information was not streamlined from the field. Multiple individuals reporting from same scene, different information.	Develop reporting mechanism. WebEOC or Ready Op.	Medium	GOHSEP/ESFs	Operations/ESFs	Communication	YES
Public Information	Initial problem of finding an FBI contact person for the NOLA press conference.	Coordinate with agencies during “blue skies”.	Medium	GOHSEP	Public Information Officer	Coordination	YES
Public Information	Press conferences were not held at GOHSEP location resulting in less involvement in what information was presented.	Coordination with agencies hosting press conferences.	Low	GOHSEP	Public Information Officer	Coordination	YES
Intel	Official Analyst were not assigned to GOHSEP, to liaison social media.	Further coordinate with GOHSEP Cyber and Emerging Threats (CET) Division. Request Intel analyst from LSP to the EOC	High	GOHSEP	Operations/CET /Louisiana State Police	Coordination	YES
Operational	One link was used for all conference calls. This caused confusion and documentation issues based on the date stamp and time of the meeting.	Set Microsoft Teams meetings to reoccurring or create new invites.	Medium	GOHSEP	Operations	Technology Utilization	YES


Observation Title	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Priority	Primary Responsible Organization	Responsible Individual	Type of Improvement	Completed - Yes, No, Ongoing
Information Sharing	Information flowing into PIO was incident specific and due to nature of unable to answer inquiries regarding circumstances.	Validate SPOTREP to ensure correct information is published in the SITREP.	Medium	GOHSEP	Operations	Communication	YES
Public Information	Recipients of state SITREP did not know if it was ok to share information received.	Will notify all recipients in each SITREP that information is public and shareable	Low	GOHSEP	Planning	Operational Procedures	Ongoing
Operational	SITREPs did not coordinate with shift changes because of how fast things were changing.	Information will be disseminated via SITREP as it is deemed important to do so by GOHSEP director related to seriousness of event.	Low	GOHSEP	Planning	Operational Procedures	YES
Operational	Agencies submitting a SITREP under a different ESF did not identify themselves. i.e.: SFM ESF-4/9 to ESF-13.	When agencies are working outside their normal ESF, they will identify themselves in WebEOC on SITREP entry.	Low	GOHSEP/ESFs	Operations/Planning	Operational Procedures	Ongoing
Operational	Due to the nature of the event, delayed formulation of street closure plan made it difficult to set up protective water barriers in a timely manner.	Coordination between responding law enforcement agencies to timely formulate street closure plan.	Medium	GOHSEP/LSP/OHSEPs	Operations	Coordination	YES


Observation Title	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Priority	Primary Responsible Organization	Responsible Individual	Type of Improvement	Completed - Yes, No, Ongoing
Reporting	211 was being used statewide, with NOLA using 311. This causes messaging issues with 2 state contracts ESF- 6 and ESF-8.	Planning will take place between state and cities before events occur to eliminate error next activation.	Low	ESF6/ESF8/ESF5	Operations	Technology Utilization	YES
Operational	Could not confirm fatalities on the scene until coroner cleared and reported the formal number. LDH could only confirm fatalities taking place at hospitals.	Prior planning and coordination with the coroner’s office, ESF-8, and GOHSEP to ascertain policies before events occur.	Low	GOHSEP/ESFs	Planning	Coordination	Ongoing


Appendix B: State Timeline of Events January 1, 2025


JANUARY 1, 2025

















Appendix C: State Timeline of Events January 2-3, 2025

January 2, 2025



- 2028** ▶ Bomb dogs alerts possibly one life jacket in a locker. JP EOD enroute.
- 2033** ▶ GOHSEP S & I per USCG confirmed reports of an IED and they are evacuating a 1 mile radius
- 2035** ▶ The LSA Task Force deputies were released by JPSO Sheriff
- 2042** ▶ Regional Security Officer (RSO)-reported that the previous statement was false and no IED was found in the locker. A complete sweep of the ferry is being conducted.
- 2109** ▶ Confirmed- Per the LNO for NOPD at NOHSEP, the whole ferry has been swept and cleared. The dog kept was alerted multiple times on the life jacket locker, but no device was found. Confirmed with USCG Sector NOLA as well.
- 2109** ▶ P&P team members are released

January 3, 2025

Time
(24-hour)

- 1542** ▶ The request for a SBA Economic Injury Disaster Loan for Orleans Parish was approved by US President

Appendix D: Acronyms

Acronyms	Meaning
AAR	After-Action Report
ATF	Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
CAT	Crisis Action Team
CET	Cyber and Emerging Threats
COOP	Continuity of Operations Plan
CST	Civil Support Team
CTAC	Cyber Threat Analysis Center
DOA	Department of Administration
DOD	Department of Defense
DOTD	Department of Transportation and Development
DPS	Department of Public Safety
EJ	East Jefferson
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EOD	Explosive Ordinance Disposal
EMS	Emergency Medical Services
ESF	Emergency Support Function
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FOUO	For Office Use Only
GCIR	Governor’s Critical Information Requirement
GOHSEP	Governor’s Office Homeland Security & Emergency Preparedness
ICS	Incident Command System
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
INSUM	Intelligence Summary
IP	Improvement Plan
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JDOM	Joint Directorate of Military Support
JICC	Joint Integration Coordination Cell
JPSO	Jefferson Parish Sheriff Office
LABEOC	Louisiana Business Emergency Operations Center
LANG	Louisiana National Guard
LEO	Law Enforcement Officer
LERN	Louisiana Response Network
LDH	Louisiana Department of Health

LDWF	Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries
LPR	License Plate Recognition
LSA	Logistics Staging Area
LSP	Louisiana State Police
MP	Military Police
NOHSEP	New Orleans Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
NOLA	New Orleans Louisiana
NOFD	New Orleans Fire Department
NOPD	New Orleans Police Department
NYPD	New York Police Department
OPH	Office of Public Health
OPS	Operations
PAX	Passengers
PIO	Public Information Officer
P&P	Probation & Parole
RSO	Regional Security Officer
SAC	Special Agent in Charge
SBA	Small Business Administration
SEOC	State Emergency Operations Center
SFMI	Sustainable Facilities Management Index
S & I	Security & Interoperability
SITREP	Situation Report
SOPs	Standard Operating Procedure
SRT	Special Response Team
SPOTREP	Spot Report
SWAT	Special Weapons and Tactics
TCP	Traffic Control Points
UMC	University Medical Center
UMR	Unit Manned Roster
USCG	United States Coast Guard
VIU	Victim Identification Unit

The After-Action Report/Improvement Plan (AAR/IP) aligns exercise objectives with preparedness doctrine and related frameworks and guidance. Exercise information required for preparedness reporting and trend analysis is included; users are encouraged to add additional sections as needed to support their own organizational needs.